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Rosenthal: Association Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities

ASSOCIATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
ANOTHER UPHILL BATTLE FOR POTENTIAL
ADA PLAINTIFFS
Lawrence D. Rosenthal*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, President George H. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")' into law. 2 At the signing of this Act, he praised it
as being a "landmark" piece of legislation that would enable individuals

with disabilities to compete in the workplace.

However, after almost

fourteen years of court decisions regarding the ADA, it has become clear

that very few plaintiffs who have attempted to use the ADA have been
successful.4 Not only have these plaintiffs been unsuccessful, but many
* Lawrence D. Rosenthal is an Assistant Professor of Legal Writing at Northern Kentucky Univer-

sity - Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Professor Rosenthal earned his J.D. from the Vanderbilt
University Law School and his LL.M. from the Georgetown University Law Center. The author
would like to thank Mr. Jay Manire for his help with this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was signed into law on July 26, 1990.
President George H. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, at
http://www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/l 990/90072600.html (July 26, 1990).
3. At the signing of the ADA, President Bush observed the following: "With today's signing
of the landmark Americans for [sic] Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child with a disability
can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom." President George H. Bush, Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html (last modified July 26,
2002).
4. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 100 (1999) (discussing that defendants prevail in more than ninetythree percent of the reported ADA cases); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 242 (2001) (demonstrating that most ADA cases
brought on appeal result in defendant-friendly outcomes). Professor Colker's articles demonstrate
how unlikely it is for ADA plaintiffs to prevail. Additionally, over the past few years, the Supreme
Court has substantially limited the scope of the ADA. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002) (holding that an employer is allowed to refuse to hire an individual if that
individual poses a "direct threat" to self); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002)
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of them have lost their cases at the summary judgment or motion to dismiss stage, without being able to take their cases to trial.5
Although the ADA was meant primarily to cover individuals who
have disabilities, 6 one of the lesser-known provisions of the Act protects
individuals against discrimination based on their association or relationship with an individual with a disability.7 This provision of the Act has
not been the subject of much litigation; 8 however, like the plaintiffs who
have sued under the other provisions of the ADA, most plaintiffs who
have attempted to use this provision of the ADA have also been unsuccessful. 9
(holding that an employer is not required to violate its seniority system to accommodate an employee requesting an accommodation); Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98
(2002) (holding that when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the ability to
perform manual tasks, the court must look at those tasks that are central to everyday life, and commenting that there needs to be a "demanding standard" for a plaintiff to qualify as being disabled);
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that a body's internal
mechanisms that compensate for an individual's physical limitations must be evaluated when determining whether that individual suffers from a disability under the Act); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (concluding that mitigating measures must be considered
when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability under the Act); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures must be taken into account when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability under the Act); see also
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Can't Stomach the Americans with Disabilities Act? How the Federal
Courts Have Gutted DisabilityDiscriminationLegislation in Cases Involving Individuals with GastrointestinalDisordersand Other Hidden Illnesses, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 449, 450 n.6 (2004) (discussing the recent ADA decisions of the United States Supreme Court).
5. Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, supra note 4, at
101-02; Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 4, at
246.
6. According to the definitions section of the ADA, a "disability" with respect to an individual is defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). In the Congressional findings section
of the ADA, Congress observed that approximately 43,000,000 Americans have one or more disabilities, and that these people face discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations,
and other aspects of life. Id. § 12101(a)(1), (a)(3). By listing the 43,000,000 figure, and by specifying that these people have suffered from discrimination, it is clear that Congress focused its attention on people with disabilities rather than on people who have relationships or associations with
people with disabilities.
7. The term "discriminate" is defined by the ADA to include "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual
with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(4) (2000).
8. As of October 5, 2004, a run of Shepard's Citators indicates that the association provision
of the ADA results in only one hundred and two total citations.
9. But see Jackson v. Serv. Eng'g, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 873, 882 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff alleged that employer terminated plaintiff
because of plaintiffs wife's illness); Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F. Supp. 2d 467, 482
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss complaint alleging discrimination based
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Courts have denied recovery to these plaintiffs for a variety of reasons. First, like many ADA plaintiffs who have sued under other provisions of the Act, many plaintiffs who have sued under the association
provision have lost their cases because they have been unable to prove a
"disability" within the meaning of the ADA. 10 Second, even if association plaintiffs have been able to prove that the associate or relative had a
"disability" under the ADA, numerous plaintiffs have been unable to
demonstrate that they had an ADA-protected relationshipor association
with the disabled individual.1" Third, some plaintiffs have failed because they have been unable to prove that they suffered an "ultimate
employment decision," which some courts require in this type of action.
In addition to the three reasons set forth above, there are other reasons these plaintiffs' claims have failed. While some ADA association
plaintiffs have not been able to prove that their employers knew they had
an association with an individual with a disability, 3 other ADA association plaintiffs have lost their claims because they mistakenly believed
that the association provision of the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate them. 14 Finally, many plaintiffs have lost their
ADA association claims because they were either (a) unable to prove
that they were qualified for the position they held; 5 (b) unable to prove
that their employer acted with discriminatory intent;16 or (c) because
these plaintiffs did not have "true" association claims. 17
Regardless of the reasons, the success rate of plaintiffs who bring
claims under the association provision of the ADA has been quite low.
This is not unlike the success rate of those who have attempted to bring
claims under the other provisions of the Act.1 8 Thus, although President
George H. Bush initially claimed that the ADA would be a "landmark"
piece of legislation that would open many "once-closed doors," the reality has been much less encouraging to most ADA plaintiffs. 19
on plaintiffs association with HIV-positive individuals). See discussion infra note 451 for a further
discussion.
10. See discussion infra section IV(A). For a definition of the term "disability," see supra
note 6.
11. See discussion infra section IV(B).
12. See discussion infra section IV(C)..
13. See discussion infra section IV(D).
14. See discussion infra section IV(E).
15. See discussion infra section IV(F).
16. See discussion infra section IV(G).
17. See discussion infra section IV(H).
18. See supranote 4.
19. ADA & IT Technical Assistance Centers, HistoricalContext of Americans with Disabili-
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As a result of these hurdles, ADA association plaintiffs need to start
finding other ways to obtain relief when they believe they have been discriminated against because of a relationship or an association with an individual with a disability or an illness. It is highly unlikely that Congress will amend the ADA, or that the courts will start giving the ADA's
association provision and the disability definition broader meanings;
therefore, when plaintiffs do 'find themselves in this situation, they must
either seek redress under different provisions of the ADA, such as the
anti-coercion20 and the anti-retaliation provisions,2 ' or under a different
statute - either the Employee Retirement. Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 22 or the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").23 State
or local laws are also available avenues for redress. Thus, if plaintiffs
want to achieve any type of success when confronted with situations
where they suffer adverse employment actions resulting from the
disability or illness of a relative or associate, they will have to start using
these additional potential avenues, in addition to asserting ADA association claims. This is because, as this article will demonstrate, the association provision of the ADA, like the other substantive provisions of the
ADA, is most often an ineffective avenue to pursue.
This article will first discuss the association provision of the ADA,
the legislative history behind it, and the executive agency interpretation
of it. The article will then focus on cases that have addressed claims
brought under this section of the ADA and will provide examples of the
many reasons these ADA plaintiffs have lost their association-based
claims. Finally, the article will suggest some possible alternatives for
employees who believe they have suffered adverse employment actions

ties Act, at http://adata.org/whatsada-history.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002).
20. The anti-coercion provision of the ADA provides the following:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000).
21. The anti-retaliation provision prevents employers from discriminating against an individual "because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." Id. § 12203(a).

22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2000).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2619, 2651-2654 (2000). This legislation allows certain employees to
take extended periods of time off from work in order to care for family members who have a serious
health condition. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). It also allows certain employees to take time off from work if
they suffer from a serious health condition that prohibits them from performing their jobs. Id. §
2612(a)(l)(D).
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as a result of some type of association or relationship with an individual
with an illness or a disability. This article will demonstrate that despite
the initial optimism behind the ADA, the association provision of this
statute has been just as ineffective as most disability advocates believe
the rest of the ADA has been. This article will further show that unless
plaintiffs find some other avenues to pursue, they. will likely be left
without a remedy when they sufferadverse employment actions as a result of their relationship or association with an individual with a disability or illness.
II.

THE ASSOCIATION DISCRIMINATION PROVISION OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT - ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND AGENCY
INTERPRETATION

At its most basic level, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 24 However, the definition of the term "discriminate" also includes "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the
known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association. '' 25 The association provision has not been the subject of nearly as much litigation as the other
provisions of the ADA, 26 and because the amount of case law is somewhat limited, an analysis of this provision's legislative history and executive agency interpretation is appropriate. 27
The legislative history behind this provision sheds light on the principal evils Congress intended to address when it included this provision
in the ADA. The impetus behind this provision came from testimony

24. The substantive provision of the ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges or employment." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (2000).
25. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
26. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Den
Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 909 F. Supp. 1393, 1399-1400 (D. Utah 1995) (finding that plaintiff's
ADA claim was unique)); see also supra note 8 (demonstrating that as of October 5, 2004, the association provision of the ADA results in only one hundred and two total Shepard's citations).
27. The agency interpretation can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") as
well as in the C.F.R.'s Interpretive Guidance. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (2000); 29 C.F.R. app.
§1630.8 (2000). Some of the relevant legislative history is found in the reports from the House
Committee on Education and Labor and the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 61-62 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343-44; H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3, at 38-39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 461-62.
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regarding an employer who terminated an employee because she had recently started caring for her AIDS-infected son, who had moved in with
her.28 Based on this history, it is clear that one reason Congress included
the association provision in the ADA was that Congress believed that
employers should not be entitled to terminate or otherwise adversely affect the employment status of a qualified individual because of that individual's association or relationship with 'an individual with a particular
illness and/or because of an employer's fear of that illness.
In addition to this evidence, Congress's intent behind this provision
of the ADA can also be discovered by reviewing other portions of the
legislative history. According to the report from the House Judiciary
Committee, the association provision was intended to cover the following hypothetical situations:
For example, it would be discriminatory for an employer to discriminate against a qualified employee who did volunteer work for people
with AIDS, if the employer knew of the employee's relationship or association with the people with AIDS, and if the employment action
was motivated by that relationship or association.
Similarly, it would be illegal for an employer to discriminate against a
qualified employee because that employee had a family member or a
friend who had a disability, if the employer knew about the relationship or association, knew that the friend or family member has a disability, and acted on that basis. Thus, if an employee had a spouse
with a disability, and the employer took an adverse action against the
employee based29 on the spouse's disability, this would then constitute
discrimination.

The House Committee on Education and Labor also provided guidance as to another situation the association provision was meant to
cover:
Thus, assume, for example that an applicant applies for a job and discloses to the employer that his or her spouse has a disability. The employer believes the applicant is qualified for the job. The employer,
however, assuming without foundation that the applicant will have to
miss work or frequently leave work early or both, in order to care for
28. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 312 (giving an example of how a "women [sic] was discriminated against simply because of her association with a
person with a disability").
29. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 38-39, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 461-62.
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his or her spouse, declines to hire the individual
for such reasons. Such
30
a refusal is prohibited by this subparagraph.
The committee then proceeded to address a situation that would not
be covered:
In contrast, assume that the employer hires the applicant. If he or she
violates a neutral -employer policy concerning attendance or tardiness,
he or she may be dismissed even if the reason for the absence or tardiness is to care for the spouse. The employer need not provide any accommodation to the nondisabled employee. The individuals covered
under this section are any individuals who are discriminated against
because
of their known association with an individual with a disabil3 1
ity.

Therefore, the legislative history suggests that one situation the association provision was meant to cover involves beliefs and stereotypes
about people who associate with, or who are related to, people with particular illnesses such as AIDS. It is also clear that while Congress was
concerned about an employer's unfounded beliefs about what the employee's associate's or relative's disability might do to the employee's
ability to work, Congress did not intend for this provision of the ADA to
cover the situation where the employee's associate's or relative's disability has actually caused the employee to miss work as a result of having to care for the other individual.
In addition to the legislative history behind this provision of the
ADA, agency interpretation also sheds light on what situations this proVision was meant to address. As one of the administrative agencies
charged with implementing the ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") articulated its interpretation of the association provision of the ADA.32 In its Interpretive Guidance to the Code of
Federal Regulations, the EEOC provided an overall explanation of this
provision 33 and provided examples of when the association provision
30. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 343-44.
31. H.R. REP. No. 101-45, pt. 2, at 61-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 344.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000) (delegating the power of interpretation to the EEOC). The
EEOC has promulgated regulations to help interpret the ADA, and these regulations include the
regulations applicable to the association provision of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (2000). Additionally, the EEOC drafted its Interpretive Guidance to this section of the C.F.R., which also provides guidance as to how the association provision should be interpreted. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8
(2000).
33. The first part of the Interpretive Guidance to this provision provides as follows:
This provision is intended to protect any qualified individual, whether or not that individual has a disability, from discrimination because that person is known to have an as-
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would form the basis of a cause of action under the ADA.34 In addition
to providing these examples of when the association provision would
apply, the EEOC also indicated that the association provision applies to
other aspects of employment, such as benefits. Specifically, with respect
to benefits, the EEOC concluded:
This provision also applies to other benefits and privileges of employment. For example, an employer that provides health insurance benefits to its employees for their dependents may not reduce the level of
those benefits to an employee simply because that employee has a dependent with a disability. This is true even if the provision of such
benefits35 would result in increased health insurance costs for the employer.
Thus, looking at the agency interpretation of this ADA provision, it
is clear that the EEOC's interpretations are consistent with the legislative
history behind the ADA's association provision. Although both the legislative history and agency interpretations do shed light on the purposes
behind the ADA's association provision, there has been very little litigation brought under this statutory provision. As a result, there have been
very few written opinions about this section of the ADA; however, in
1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Den
Hartog v. Wasatch Academy 36 issued a very thorough and detailed opinion on the association provision of the ADA. Since that time, several
courts have relied on the Den Hartog opinion when presented with an
ADA association claim.3 7
sociation or relationship with an individual who has a known disability. This protection
is not limited to those who have a familial relationship with an individual with a disability.
Id.
34. Specifically, the EEOC gives the following example of when the association provision
would cover an employee:
To illustrate the scope of this provision, assume that a qualified applicant without a disability applies for a job and discloses to the employer that his or her spouse has a disability. The employer thereupon declines to hire the applicant because the employer believes that the applicant would have to miss work or frequently leave work early in order
to care for the spouse. Such a refusal to hire would be prohibited by this provision.
Similarly, this provision would prohibit an employer from discharging an employee because the employee does volunteer work with people who have AIDS, and the employer
fears that the employee may contract the disease.
Id.
35. Id.
36. 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1997).
37. As of October 5, 2004, a search using Shepard's Citators reveals that since 1997, there has
been a total of one hundred and nine total citation references to this opinion. Included in this num-
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III. THE DEN HARTOG OP[NION
Prior to 1997, very few United States Courts of Appeals had addressed the association provision of the ADA. 3 8 That year, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an extended and
complete opinion regarding the association provision, its legislative history, the EEOC's interpretation of the provision, and its intended application. 39 The Tenth Circuit also set forth a framework for analyzing

these cases, a framework which has been adopted by other federal
courts. 40 As a result of its thorough treatment of the association provision of the ADA, Den Hartog has become a widely-cited case involving

association discrimination.4'
In Den Hartog, the plaintiff, a teacher at a private high school, was
fired after his son, who suffered from bipolar disorder, carried out
threats of violence against some members of the local community with
ties to the school.42 Initially, the employer allowed the plaintiff to work
"off campus," so as to avoid any potential contact between the plaintiffs
son and other members of the school community.4 3 However, after the
one-year "off campus" appointment, the employer decided not to renew
the plaintiffs contract. 4 Although the employer tried to argue that the
plaintiffs contract was not renewed because his position no longer exber are sixty-six references to cases that have cited this opinion, fourteen of which have specifically
followed the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
38. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1083. Some of the pre- Den Hartog published opinions from the
United States Courts of Appeals include Rogers v. InternationalMarine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d
755, 761 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer because plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate that his employer terminated him as a result of his disabled wife), Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Business & Education Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of employer because plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of
association discrimination), and Tyndall v. NationalEducation Centers, Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214, 216
(4th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer because plaintiff was unable to
attend work on regular basis due to illness of family member).
39. See Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1081-86.
40. The Den Hartog opinion incorporated the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach
used in other employment discrimination cases. Id.at 1085. For a complete discussion of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach used in employment discrimination litigation, see
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motionsfor Summary Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L.
REV.335 (2002). Additionally, the Den Hartog opinion established a method for determining how
a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case under the association provision of the ADA. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085.
41. See supra note 37.
42. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1078, 1080.
43. Id.at 1079.
44. Id.at 1080.
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isted, the employer admitted that had the plaintiff not had problems with
his son, the plaintiff would have most likely still been employed by the
school.45
The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division and the EEOC, and then sued his former employer under both the ADA and state law.4 6 The lower court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment on. the plaintiff s ADA claim,
and a jury eventually returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the
plaintiffs breach of contract claim.47 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the lower court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs ADA association
claim was appropriate for summary judgment.48
The court first addressed whether the plaintiffs son suffered from a
disability within the meaning of the ADA. 49 .Relying on the statutory
definition of "disability ' 50 and the appropriate regulations,5 ' the court
determined that the plaintiff's son had a disability under the ADA.52 The
court then addressed the substance of the association discrimination
45. Id.
46. Id. The plaintiff's state-law claim was a breach of contract claim.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1081. An ADA plaintiff's claim will fail if the plaintiff or an associate or relative of
an ADA association plaintiff does not suffer from a disability as that term is defined by the ADA.
See, e.g., Larimer v. IBM, Corp., No. 02-C-3160, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29,
2003), affd, 370 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2004); see also discussion infra section IV(A).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
51. The relevant definitions related to the disability determination are those of "physical or
mental impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activity." The Code of Federal Regulations defines "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, heric and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Regulations to Implement the EEOC Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2000).
The Code of Federal Regulations defines "substantially limits" as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the
same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.20)(1).
The Code of Federal Regulations defines "major life activity" as: "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i).
52. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1081.
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claim.53
The court started by acknowledging that the ADA does indeed prohibit association discrimination, and that, according to the Code of Federal Regulations, "[a] family relationship is the paradigmatic example of
'relationship' under the association provision of the ADA. '54 The court
then recognized that there had been very little litigation under this provision of the ADA. 55 As a result, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the provision's legislative history and agency interpretation.5 6
After addressing these issues, the court turned to the few appellate-level
cases that had addressed this provision of the ADA.57 Those cases, the
Tenth Circuit observed, involved the exact type of scenario Congress
envisioned when it enacted this provision of the ADA. It did not address
the specific issue presented in this case, namely "whether the association
provision of the ADA protects a qualified employee from adverse employment action based on his disabled associate's misconduct, where the
associate's misconduct does not impair the employee's job performance." 58 Finally, after analyzing the difference between a disability and
misconduct caused by a disability, and after analyzing the direct threat
defense, the court concluded that the employer's decision to terminate
the plaintiff did not violate the ADA. 59
Most important for purposes of this article, however, was the Tenth
Circuit's discussion regarding how to analyze ADA association claims.
Specifically, the court determined that ADA association claims should
be analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach
used in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII")

60

and the

Age Discrimination

in Employment

Act

("ADEA").6 t

Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. 62 Next, the burden ofproduction (not
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1082 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (1996)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1082-84. For the legislative history behind this ADA provision and the agency interpretation of this provision, see discussion supra section I.
57. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1083 (citing Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755
(5th Cir. 1996); Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1092.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e to 2000e-17 (2000).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2000). See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 142 (2000) (assuming, but not deciding, that the burden-shifting approach used in cases
brought under Title VII applies to cases brought under the ADEA).
62. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085. In a typical employment discrimination claim based on

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

11

2004]

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5
ASSOCIATION DISCRIMINATION

the burden of persuasion) shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.63
Finally, if the employer meets this burden of production, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's articulated reason
action, but rather
was not the real reason for the adverse employment
64
reason.
real
the
was
motive
that a discriminatory
One of the key questions the Den Hartog court decided was how an
ADA association plaintiff can establish a prima facie case. 65 After considering both parties' suggestions and previous ADA case law, the court
concluded that in order to establish a prima facie case of association discrimination under the ADA, it must be shown that
(1) the plaintiff was 'qualified' for the job at the time of the adverse
employment action; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff was known by his employer at the time to
have a relative or associate with a disability; [and] (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inor associate was a determining
ference that the disability of the relative
66
decision.
employer's
the
in
factor
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must then
articulate a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.",67 Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason articulated by the employer is not the real reason for the adverse employment
action, and that the real reason is discrimination. 6 8 This analytical
framework from the Den Hartog.opinion has been used by numerous
post-1997 ADA association discrimination claims. 69 However, regardrace, sex, or age, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by establishing (1) that he was a member
of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position in question; (3) that he was not selected for the position despite his qualifications; and (4) that the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As the Supreme Court later made clear, this
prima facie test is flexible, and depends to some degree on the facts in each case. Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802 n.13).
63. See McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802. See generally Rosenthal, Motionsfor Summary
Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justificationsfor Adverse Employment Actions: Why the
Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, supra note 40, at 340-55 (analyzing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
64. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
65. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
68. Id. (citing McDonnellDouglas,411 U.S. at 804).
69. See supra note 38; see also Larimer v. IBM Corp., No. 02-C-3160, 2003 U.S. Dist.
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less of which court uses this framework, the outcome is typically the
same - the ADA association plaintiff is usually unable to prevail.
IV. UNSUCCESSFUL CASES BROUGHT UNDER THE ASSOCIATION
PROVISION OF THE

ADA

The next section of this article will analyze several cases brought
under the association provision of the ADA. As this section will make
clear, the plaintiffs in these cases have had extreme difficulty in prevailing under the association provision of the ADA. The reasons these
plaintiffs fail are numerous, including (A) an inability to demonstrate
that the associate or relative has a "disability" within the meaning of the
ADA; (B) an inability to demonstrate a protected relationship or association with an individual with a disability; (C) an inability to prove that
the plaintiff suffered an "ultimate employment decision"; (D) an inability to demonstrate that the plaintiff's employer knew of the employee's
relative's or associate's disability; (E) the fact that the association provision of the ADA does not require an employer to provide any accommodations to individuals with disabled relatives or associates; (F) an inability to demonstrate that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in
question; (G) an inability to demonstrate that the employer acted with
discriminatory motives; and (H) because the claims the plaintiffs asserted were not "true" association claims. Regardless of the reason, the

LEXIS 7396, at *22-23 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2003), ajfd, 370 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining the
four requirements to establish a prima facie ADA association claim); Anthony v. United Tel. Co.,
277 F. Supp. 2d 763, 770 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (explaining the four requirements to establish a prima
facie ADA association claim); Jackson v. Serv. Eng'g, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (describing how the Den Hartog court explained the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas); Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 60 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that
the employer is not required to provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation); Rocky v.
Columbia Lawnwood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (explaining that
a familial relationship is an example-of a protected relationship under the association provision of
the ADA); Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F. Supp. 2d 467, 480 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining the
four requirements to establish a prima facie ADA association claim); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N.
Am., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1998), affd, 181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining the four requirements to establish a prima facie ADA association claim); Moresi v. AMR
Corp., No. 3:98-CV-1518-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13644, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1999) (explaining the four requirements to establish a prima facie ADA association claim); Atkinson v. Wiley
Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (explaining the four requirements
to establish a prima facie ADA association claim); Barker v. Int'l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10 (D.
Me. 1998) (explaining that a familial relationship is an example of a protected relationship under the
association provision of the ADA); Bates v. Powerlab, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2551-P, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8034, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 1998) (explaining the four requirements to establish a
prima facie ADA association claim).
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outcomes in these association claims are typically the same - the employer will defeat the plaintiff s cause of action.
A. Plaintiffs Who FailedBecause of an Inability to
Prove a "Disability"
One of the primary reasons ADA association plaintiffs have failed
is that they have been unable to prove that their relative or associate suffered from a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. This hurdle
has become even more difficult to overcome in recent years, as the Supreme Court has limited the ADA's definition of disability. °
One recent case in which the plaintiffs ADA association claim
failed because he was unable to prove a "disability" was Larimer v. InternationalBusiness Machines, Corp.71 In Larimer, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois determined that the
plaintiff's twin daughters, who were born almost two months prematurely and with several impairments, did not meet the statutory definition
of having a disability.72 As a result, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.7 3
Thomas Larimer had worked for the defendant for approximately
one year when his employer fired him, allegedly for performance issues. 74 This termination occurred approximately three months after his
wife had given birth to twin daughters. 5 The daughters were born with
respiratory distress syndrome, suspected sepsis, jaundice, apnea, a slowing of the heart rate, and prematurity. 76 Additionally, one of the twins
suffered from bleeding of the brain and a problem with the brain tissue,
while the other suffered from a vascular skin lesion.7 7 During their
lengthy stays in the hospital, the children required mechanical ventilation and mechanical feeding, and if they had not received these treatments, they would not have survived. 78 Eventually, however, both children were able to leave the hospital. 79 At the time of the defendant's
70.
71.
698 (7th
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra note 4.
No. 02-C-3160, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396 (N.D. 111.Apr. 29, 2003), ajfd, 370 F.3d
Cir. 2004).
Id. at *3,*15-16, *35.
Id. at *35.
Id. at *3-4, * 14-15.
Id. at *3.
Id. at*15-16.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *16-17.
Id. at * 16.
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motion for summary judgment, however, it was uncertain whether these
conditions 80would cause long-term health consequences for the plaintiff's
daughters.
In his two-count complaint, 1 the plaintiff alleged that his employer
violated the association provision of the ADA because it terminated him
because of his association with his daughters. 82 After acknowledging
that the Seventh Circuit had not yet addressed an ADA association
claim, the court adopted the prima facie test established by the Tenth
Circuit.8 3 Even though there were questions about the plaintiffs ability
to establish the other elements of his prima facie case, the court first
went into a discussion about whether the plaintiffs daughters satisfied
the ADA's strict definition of "disability., 84 Acknowledging that an
ADA plaintiff can establish a disability in one of three ways, the court
analyzed the plaintiffs claim under the first prong - that the plaintiffs
daughters had actual disabilities - and the third prong - that the plaintiff's daughters were regarded as. having disabilities. 85 Relying on the
test the Supreme Court developed in Bragdon v. Abbott, 86 the court concluded that the daughters had impairments and that the impairments did
indeed affect major life activities.87 However, like many ADA cases,
80. Id. at*18.
81. The, plaintiff also alleged that his former employer violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000). Under this statute, an employer cannot retaliate
against an employee because that employee has attempted to exercise a right provided to him pursuant to an employee benefit plan. See id.
82. Larimer,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *20-21.
83. Id. at *21-22 (relying on Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1997)).
For a discussion of this opinion, see supra section III.
84. Larimer, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *22 (defining disability under the ADA).
85. Id. at *22-23.
86. 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that the plaintiff's HIV-positive status was a "disability"
under the ADA). Under Bragdon, to determine whether an individual suffers from a "disability"
within the meaning of the ADA, courts will first look at whether the plaintiff suffers from a "physical or mental impairment." Id. at 632. If the plaintiff is able to demonstrate such an impairment,
courts will determine whether the impairment "substantially limits" a "major life activity." Id. at
637, 639. Of course, the plaintiff can also demonstrate a "disability" by proving that he has a record
of such an impairment or by proving that he was regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (2000).
87. Larimer, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *22-24. The major life activities the plaintiff's
daughters' impairments affected included eating and breathing. Id. at *24. The C.F.R. lists breathing as a "major life activity," but eating is not listed. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000). However, this
regulation is not an exclusive list, as.is indicated by the phrase "such as" before the list of examples
of major life activities. See id.; see also Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that eating is a
major life activity under the ADA)). In addition, although the C.F.R. does not list eating as a "major life activity," it can be construed that "caring for oneself [or] performing manual tasks" would
include eating. See 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(i).
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daughters'
Larimer's case failed because he was unable to prove that his
88
impairments substantiallylimited these major life activities.
Although the plaintiff was able to present testimony that his daughters would not have survived without the mechanical assistance they received, the court focused more on the duration of the medical problems
rather than on their severity. 89 Relying on the Code of Federal Regulations, which establishes a multi-factor test to determine whether a limitation is substantial,9" the court concluded that because the plaintiff was
unable to prove with certainty that his daughters' limitations on major
life activities were permanent, he could not satisfy the first prong of the
ADA's definition of disability. 91 The court reached this conclusion even
though it was possible that the long-term effects of the illnesses could
have caused, among other things, mental retardation and cerebral
palsy.92 In reaching this conclusion, the court also relied on the Supreme
Court's language in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 3 where the Court
noted that the Act covers only actual, as opposed to hypothetical or potential, disabilities. 94 Despite acknowledging that the plaintiffs daughters' young ages made it extremely difficult to establish that the daughters were indeed disabled, the court concluded that his daughters could
not establish a disability under the first prong of the ADA's "disability"
95
definition.
The plaintiffs next argument was that his daughters had disabilities
88. Larimer,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *31.
89. See id. at *25-30.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2). [Pursuant to the regulations, tihe following factors should be
considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment: [sic]
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of or resulting from the impairment.
Id.
91. Larimer,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *29-31.
92. Id. at *28.
93. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures must be taken into consideration when determining whether an individual suffers from a "disability" within the meaning of the
ADA).

94. The Court in Sutton noted the following:
Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in the present indicative verb
form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently - not
potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.
A "disability" exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken.
Id.
95.

Larimer,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at * 31.
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under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's "disability" definition.96
Under this prong of the •definition, the plaintiff could have prevailed if
he had been able to show not only that his employer knew that his
daughters suffered from impairments, but also that his! employer believed that one or more of these impairments substantially limited one or
more of the daughters' major life activities..97
. The employer launched a two-pronged attack on this part. of the
plaintiffs case, arguing first that this allegation was "beyond the scope"
of the plaintiffs EEOC charge, 98 and then arguing that nobody regarded
the plaintiffs daughters as having disabilities. 99 Although the plaintiff
was able to defeat his former employer's "beyond the scope" argument,
he was unable to defeat the substantive argument that the employer did
not regard his daughters as being disabled.' 00
With respect to the EEOC charge argument, the court quickly rejected the defendant's position. 0 1 Although the plaintiff had not specifically identified the "regarded as" prong in the EEOC charge, he did state
that he believed he was discriminated against because of his association
with "people with disabilities. 1 0 2 The court concluded that because the
ADA's definition of "disability" included people who were "regarded
as" being disabled, the plaintiff's charge sufficiently covered this potential argument.l°3

.However, the court was not as sympathetic to the substance of the
plaintiffs "regarded as" claim. 10 4 Specifically, the court found that the
plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that his supervisors regarded
his daughters as being disabled. 10 5 According to the court, the most the
plaintiff did was present evidence that his employer knew that there

96. Id. at *32; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (containing three options for potential
ADA plaintiffs).

97. Larimer, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *33.
98. Id. Before bringing a lawsuit in federal court, an aggrieved individual must first file a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1) (2000). Eventually, the EEOC will provide the charging party with a Right to Sue notice,
after which the charging party will have ninety days to file his or her lawsuit. See Id. § 2000e5(f)(1). For a more thorough explanation of the EEOC charge-filing process, see EEOC's Charge
Processing Procedures,
at http://eeoc.gov./charge/overview-charge-processing.htm
99. Larimer, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *34.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

(last modified Aug. 13, 2003).

/d. at*33-35.
Id. at*33.
Id.
Id. at *33-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000)).
Id.
Id. at*35.
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were complications with the plaintiffs wife's pregnancy.10 6 The court
therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's ADA association claim. 10 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Smith
v. Hinkle Manufacturing, Inc.,'0 8 also rejected a plaintiffs association
discrimination claim because the plaintiff was unable to prove an association or relationship with an individual with a disability, as that term is
defined in the ADA. 10 9 In Smith, the court affirmed the lower court's
granting of summary judgment on the plaintiff's ADA claim in favor of
the defendant,1 10but it reversed the summary judgment on the plaintiffs
ERISA claim.
The plaintiff in Smith was terminated two weeks after she informed
her employer's accounting supervisor about her son's brain disease and
had inquired about the possibility of obtaining leave under the FMLA."'
Although the employer claimed that the plaintiff had been terminated for
poor performance, the court concluded that there -were genuine issues of
material fact regarding the true reason behind the plaintiffs discharge,
and that12 summary judgment was inappropriate on the plaintiff's ERISA
claim.'
Despite her success on the ERISA claim, the plaintiff was unable to
convince the court of the merits of her ADA association claim and her
parallel state law association claim. 1 3 After first rejecting the plaintiffs
state law association claim because there was no similar association discrimination language in the state anti-discrimination statute, the court
then went on to address the plaintiffs ADA association claim. 1 4 The
plaintiff argued that her son had a disability, but the court quickly rejected this argument.' 5 After reciting the ADA's definition of disabil-ity, the court concluded that the plaintiff "produced no evidence" that
.her son was substantially limited in any major life activities., 16 In addressing the "perceived disability" argument, the court concluded that

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.

110.

Id.

Id.
36 FED Appx. 0825P (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 831.

111. Id. at 827.
112. Id. at 830. See discussion infra section V(B), for the ERISA portion of this opinion.
113. Smith, 2002 FED App. at 0830P-0831P.
114. Id. (indicating that even though Ohio courts look to federal law for guidance, they do so
only when the ADA is similar to the Ohio law).
115. Id.at831.
116. Id.
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the plaintiffs evidence that her supervisor suggested that she inquire
about taking time off under the FMLA 1 7 was not sufficient to avoid
summary judgment on that issue.11 8 Therefore, the court affirmed the
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ADA claim.' 1 9
In Ennis v. The National Ass 'n of Business & Educational Radio,
Inc.,12° the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff was covered under the association provision of the ADA. 12 1 In Ennis, the plaintiff filed her complaint
against her former employer, alleging a violation of the association provision of the ADA. 22 The plaintiff believed she had been terminated
from her employment because of the health care costs associated with
her HIV-positive son. 123 However, the employer was able to convince
the court that it was the plaintiffs poor work performance, and not her
association with her son, that was the cause of the adverse employment
action. 124
The court first addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework would apply to association claims brought under the
ADA.1 25 After concluding that it did, the court then considered how an
ADA association plaintiff would establish her prima facie case. 26 After
reviewing case law from the United States Supreme Court, various
United States Courts of Appeals, and its own previous decisions, 127 the
court determined that such a prima facie case could be established by
proving membership in a protected class, discharge, job performance at a

117. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2619, 2651-2654 (2000). The FMLA allows certain employees to take
extended periods of time off from work in order to care for ill family members. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
It also allows certain employees to take time off from work if they suffer from a serious health condition that prohibits them from performing their jobs. Id. § 2612(a)(l)(D).
118. Smith, 2002 FED App. at 0831P (relying on Kvintous v. R.L. Polk & Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d
788 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1313 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that an employer's offer of
paid medical leave is not sufficient to infer a perceived disability)).
119. Id.
120. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
121. Id, at 57-59 (relying on the Den Hartog prima facie elements as well as the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework to determine if the plaintiff could prevail under the association
provision of the ADA).
122. Id. at 57.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 61-62.
125. Id. at 57-58.
126. Id. at 58.
127. Id. (relying on Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338 (8th Cir. 1994);
Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993); Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413
(4th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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level that met the employer's legitimate expectations, and circumstances
that raised a "reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."'' 2 8 Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was unof her employer, it
able to prove that she was meeting the expectations
129
first examined whether her son had a disability.
Essentially, the court was asked to determine whether the HIVpositive status of the plaintiffs son constituted a "disability" within the
meaning of the ADA.13 0 The court first set forth the three-part definition
of "disability" under the Act, and then recognized that the disability determination must be made on an individual, case-by-case basis, looking
at the actual effects the disease has on the victim. 13' The Fourth Circuit
noted that although the plaintiffs son was HIV-positive, he was asymp32
tomatic and experienced no limitations on any major life activities.
The court also noted that the mother conceded that her son had not experienced any "ailments or conditions that affected the way he lived on a
daily basis.' 33 Finally, the court noted that there was no evidence that
the plaintiff's employer regarded her son as being disabled or that he had
any record of having a disability. 134 As a result of this lack of evidence,
the court strongly suggested (but did
not hold) that the plaintiffs son did
135
not have a disability under the Act.
Another recent case to address this situation came from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Sacay v.
Research Foundation of the City University of New York. 136 In Sacay, a
mother and daughter brought suit against their common employer after
the employer eliminated the mother's position, alleging that the employer violated several federal and local laws, including the association
128.
129.
130.

Id.
See id. at 59-60.
See id. Since this opinion, the United States Supreme Court has determined that an HIV-

positive individual can have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). However, since Bragdon, at least one court has determined that an HIVpositive individual does not automatically have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See
Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that the HIV-positive plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA because he could not prove a
substantial limitation on any major life activity).
131.

Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59.

132. Id. at 60.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135.

See id. Although strongly suggesting that the plaintiff's son did not have a disability under

the ADA, the Fourth Circuit assumed, for purposes of that opinion, that he did have a disability. Id.
The court did this after acknowledging that at this stage of the litigation, the record had not been

fully developed on this issue. Id.
136.

193 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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provision of the ADA. 137 The mother in Sacay suffered from a number
of ailments, including 'a partial seizure disorder, back problems, neck
problems, poor vision, chest pain (which was later determined to be a
myocardial infarction, an ulcer, segall bladder attack), a post-surgical
38
vere gastritis, and a hiatus hernia.1
The court first addressed the mother's claims, which ultimately affected the success (or failure) of the daughter's ADA association
claim. 39 After disposing of many of the mother's claims on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds, 4 0 the court then addressed the merits of
her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. 14 ' Not surprisingly, the court
first had to decide whether the mother
did indeed suffer from a disability
42
within the meaning of the ADA. 1

Because the defendants did not contest that the mother suffered
from impairments, the court first focused on the alleged major life activities the mother claimed were substantially limited. 143 The court determined that some of these activities were not "major life activities" and
ended up evaluating the mother's ability to work, engage in physical activities, eliminate waste, sit, and lift, and it concluded that she was un-

able to present a genuine issue of material fact about whether she was
substantially limited in any of those activities.144 When granting the
employer's ADA summary judgment motion on the disability issue, the

court also determined that granting the employer's motion
for summary
145

judgment under the Rehabilitation Act was appropriate.
The court then addressed the daughter's association claim.

46

The

137. Id. at 614-15. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id.
at 615. Most cases brought under the ADA are analyzed the same way in which cases are analyzed
under the Rehabilitation Act; however, the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically contain an association provision. See Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 38 F. Supp. 2d 91, 100 n.3
(D.P.R. 1999), affid, 214 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (assuming that the Rehabilitation Act does allow
for claims based on association discrimination despite the absence of any statutory language to that
effect).
138. Sacay, 193 F. Supp. 2d. at 615-16.
139. Id. at 625-30.
140. Id. at 624.
141. Id. at 625,629.
142. See id. at 626.
143. Id. at 627. The mother claimed the she was substantially limited in the following activities: traveling, working, controlling the elimination of waste, and performing physical activities
such as lifting, pushing, pulling, carrying, and sitting. Id.
144. Id. at 627-29.
145. Id. at 629-30, 636.
146. Id. at 630.
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crux of the daughter's claim was that she suffered adverse employment
actions because of her association with her mother, who, according to
the daughter, had a disability.1 47 The court first stated that the association provision of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals
based upon their known association or relationship with an individual
with a disability.148 Next, the court observed that one purpose behind
this provision was to protect individuals against discrimination because
of an employer's assumption that such an association would
49 require the
employee to miss work to care for the disabled individual. 1
After addressing the purpose behind this provision of the ADA, the
court articulated the necessary elements of a prima facie case in an association claim. 150 Although the court identified the usual four elements, it
stopped its analysis quickly and concluded that because the plaintiffs
mother did not have a disability under the ADA, the plaintiff could not
employer's motion. for sumprevail.151 The court therefore granted the
52
mary judgment on the association claim. 1
As the previously discussed cases demonstrate, many ADA association plaintiffs have failed because they were unable to prove that they
had an association or relationship with someone with a "disability" as
that term is defined by the ADA. This problem has also plagued many
individuals who have attempted to sue under the ADA based upon their
own "disabilities" and were unable to convince a court that they suffered
from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. 53
However, as the next several sections of this article will demonstrate,
this is not the only reason why many ADA association plaintiffs have
failed. Another major hurdle these plaintiffs face is that they must also
prove that they have the type of relationship or associationthe ADA association provision was intended to protect.
B. Plaintiffs Who FailedBecause They Could Not Prove a Protected
Relationship or Association with an Individual with a Disability
Another basis upon which courts have relied when deciding against

Id.

147.
148.

Id.

149.

Id.

150. See id.

151. Id. (noting that the daughter's claim failed "because she has not shown she was known by
her employer to have a relative with a disability under the ADA ...[her] mother was not disabled").
152. Id.
at 636.
153. See supra note 4.
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ADA association plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs in these cases were not
able to establish that they enjoyed a protected relationshipor association
with an individual who has a disability. 154 In these cases, because the
plaintiffs were unable to convince the court that they had a "close
enough" association or relationship with the individual with a disability,
they could not prevail.
One such case was decided by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia in O'Connell v. Isocor Corp.155 In
O'Connell, the court concluded that because the plaintiff was unable to
establish that she shared a protected relationship or association with an
individual with a disability, summary judgment in favor of her former
employer was appropriate. 156 With respect to her ADA association
claim, the plaintiff alleged that her former employer terminated her to
protect itself in another disability discrimination lawsuit brought by an
HIV-positive former employee who was trying to show that the company's decision to terminate him and retain the plaintiff (who was similarly situated but
who did not have a disability) was based on his HIV157
status.
positive
The plaintiffs termination occurred one day after her former employer was served with the HIV-positive former employee's complaint,
which made reference to the plaintiff as being a similarly situated, but
retained, employee. 5 8 First, the court acknowledged that this was a case
of first impression in that jurisdiction. 159 Next, the court phrased the issue as being whether "an employer's perception that the continued employment of a non-disabled employee, who is referred to as a comparator
in an ADA lawsuit against the employer, constitute[s] an 'association' as
envisioned by the ADA."'160 The court concluded
that Congress did not
161
intend the ADA to protect such a relationship.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(,) (2000). The specific language of the ADA defines the term "discriminate" to include "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a relationship or association." Id.
155. 56 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Va. 1999).
156. Id. at 653.
157. Id. at 651.
158.

Id.

159. Id. at 652.
160. Id. Prior to articulating the issue in this manner, the court identified the issue as being
"whether being referred to by a co-worker in an ADA lawsuit creates an 'association' between instant plaintiff... and the co-worker who filed the suit..., where the nature of the reference is a
suggestion that the employer's failure to terminate the non-disabled co-worker ... evidences unlawful discrimination against the suing co-worker.
Id.
161. Id.at653.
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The court acknowledged that the association provision does protect
individuals because of their known association with an individual with a
disability. 62 Relying on the Code of Federal Regulations, 163 the court
then acknowledged that the purpose behind this provision of the ADA
was to prohibit employers from taking adverse employment actions
against employees based on this type of "family, business, social, or
other relationship or association."'164 It then articulated the two examples
165
of the type of situation the association provision was meant to cover one being a situation where an employee or potential employee suffers
an adverse employment action because of an employer's concern about
whether that employee would be forced to miss work to care for an individual with a disability, and the other being a situation where an employee who does volunteer work with AIDS patients suffers an adverse
employment action because
of his employer's fear that the employee
66
might contract AIDS.
The court went on to distinguish the current case from a case upon
which the plaintiff relied in her argument, and ultimately concluded that
the case upon which the plaintiff relied, which involved allegations of
Title VII race discrimination, was not directly analogous to this ADA
claim.' 67 After rejecting this analogy, the court concluded that the association provision of the ADA was not meant to protect this type of "association."' 168 Referring to the Code of Federal Regulations, the court
stated:
As the regulations make clear, the ADA's purpose is to prevent discrimination against.., those who may have a close familial, social, or
162. Id. at 652.
163. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (2000). This section provides that an employer may not take an
adverse employment action against an individual because of the fear that the individual will miss
work in order to care for a sick relative. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (2000). It also provides that an
employer may not take an adverse employment action against an individual out of fear that he might
contract some type of communicable disease such as AIDS. Id.
164. O'Connell, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 652. The plaintiff acknowledged that she did not have a
"business, social, or other relationship or association" with her co-worker other than having the
same employer and speaking to him on a few occasions. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (relying on 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8).
167. Id. at 652-53. The plaintiff attempted to analogize her case to Crowley v. Prince George's
County, 890 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1989), where the court determined that a white employee who was
demoted in order to allow the employer to defend against a separate race discrimination claim
brought by a black former employee stated a cause of action under Title VII. O'Connell, 56 F.
Supp. 2d at 652.
168. O'Connell, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (relying on Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio,
Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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possibly even physical relationship with a disabled person. The paradigmatic case is that of the parent of a disabled child, whose employer
may fear that the child's disability
may compromise the employee's
169
ability to perform his or her job.

After making this observation, the court relied on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Den Hartog and opined that applying the association

provision to this situation would not be consistent with Congress's intent
when it enacted this provision.

70

Because the relationship between the

plaintiff and the HIV-positive former employee was not the type of relationship or situation Congress envisioned when it enacted the association
provision of the ADA, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument and
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.' 7 '

Other courts have also concluded that certain ADA association
plaintiffs were not within the class of persons protected by this provision
of the statute as a result of a claimed associationor relationship with a
third party. For example, the United States District Court for the Northem District of Alabama, in Lester v. Compass Bank,7 2 reached this con-

clusion when a former employee attempted to use the ADA's association
provision to recover after he "championed the cause" of a disabled applicant for an open position. 73 In Lester, the plaintiff was terminated
from his position with a security services firm shortly after he had recommended an amputee for a position with his employer. 174 Although
the plaintiff did have some performance issues, the court noted that at
the time of his termination, the plaintiff had corrected many, "if not all,"
of those problems. 75 The plaintiff sued his former employers, alleging

169. Id.
170. Id. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that it was Congress's belief that it was "in society's best interest to encourage others to care for and assist disabled people," and that allowing employers to terminate or otherwise adversely affect the employment status of close family members
of individuals with disabilities would further harm individuals with disabilities. Id.
171. See id.
172. No. 96-AR-0812-S, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11575 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 1997).
173. Id.at * 11. This opinion is not particularly clear on whether the plaintiff was, in fact, arguing that he was terminated because of his association with an individual with a disability. The court
fully addressed this assertion, but then indicated that the plaintiff did not assert he was terminated
"because he associated with or befriended" the disabled individual. See id. at *9-11 . Rather, the
plaintiff alleged that he was terminated for "champion[ing] the cause" for the individual with a disability. Id. at * 11. The court observed that such activity is protected, but that the association provision of the ADA is not the appropriate provision for that type of protection. Id. Specifically, such
"championing" would be protected by the anti-retaliation or anti-coercion provision of the ADA.
See id.
174. Id.at *5-6.
175. Id. at *6.
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with the disthat they terminated him because of his alleged association
6
hired.
eventually
employers
the
whom
abled applicant
Not surprisingly, the court began its analysis by reciting the language of the association provision and then articulating the elements a
plaintiff needs to prove in order to establish a prima facie case under this
provision of the ADA.'7 7 The court decided that Lester could not demonstrate he was a member of a protected class; therefore, he did not establish the first element of a prima facie case, giving the court no reason
78
to examine any of the remaining elements of the prima facie case.
In addressing the protected class requirement, the court started its
analysis by examining the EEOC's interpretive guidelines regarding the
ADA's association provision. 179 According to the court, and consistent
with other courts' interpretations of the EEOC's position, these guidelines indicate that the goal behind the association provision was to prevent "unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about employees who associate with disabled people."' 180 The court also highlighted the same
examples to which the court in O'Connell referred, those being cases involving an individual who would have to miss work to care for a sick
family member and of an individual who performs volunteer work for
people with AIDS. 181
Although acknowledging that the plaintiff need not be a family
member of the disabled individual, the court concluded that this plaintiff
did not have the type of relationship or association Congress intended to
protect when it enacted the association provision of the ADA. 182 Because the plaintiff had only met the job applicant one time, and because
that applicant testified that he did not consider the plaintiff to be a "close
personal friend," the court rejected the plaintiffs claim and granted the

176. /d.at*1-2.
177.
178.
179.
sion,-

Id. at *8 (citing Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1581 (N.D. Okla. 1996)).
/d.at'9-10.
Id. at *9. The EEOC Interpretative Guidance provides that the ADA association provi-

is intended to protect any qualified individual, whether or not that individual has a disability, from discrimination because that person is known to have an association or relationship with an individual who has a known disability. This protection is not limited to
those who have a familial relationship with an individual with a disability.
Regulations to Implement the EEOC Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (2000).
180. Lester, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11575, at *9 (citing Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc.,
87 F.3d 755, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1996)).
181. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209,
214 (4th Cir. 1994); Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596, 604 (D. Me. 1994)).

182. Seeid.at*10.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/5

26

Rosenthal: Association Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities
158

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:132

183
employer's motion for summary judgment.
As the previously described cases demonstrate, many ADA association plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they shared a protected association or relationship with an individual who had a disability. However, as the next several sections of this article will demonstrate, there
are also other reasons why these plaintiffs have failed in their attempts to
use this provision to protect against adverse employment actions. One
such reason is that ADA association plaintiffs have been unable to prove
they suffered the type of adverse employment action the ADA was
meant to cover.

C. Cases Where the Plaintiffs CouldNot Prove An
"Ultimate Employment Decision"
Another basis upon which plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADA's
association provision have lost their cases is their inability to prove an
"ultimate employment decision."' 184 Some courts believe an "ultimate
employment decision" is a requirement needed to prevail under this provision of the ADA. More specifically, these plaintiffs have not been
successful because the adverse employment actions they suffered were
not "serious enough" to justify finding an ADA violation.
Such a conclusion was reached in Darby v. Hinds County Department of Human Services.' 85 In Darby, the court rejected the plaintiffs
ADA association claim after it concluded that the actions taken against
the plaintiff, including written and verbal reprimands, poor work evaluations, and co-worker harassment, did not entitle her to relief under the
ADA. 8 6 Specifically, in Darby, the plaintiff brought suit under the
FMLA 8 7 and the ADA after her employer denied her requests for leave
and allegedly retaliated against her. 88 The plaintiff had several ill relatives: her son suffered from a severe case of asthma, her mother was in a9
8
coma, and her daughter had been seriously injured in a car accident.
The plaintiff was denied leave to care for her family members and even183.

Id. at *10-11 (observing that the interpretive guidelines to the C.F.R. also indicated that a

"one-time chance meeting does not equate [to] an association").
184. See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997); Dollis v. Rubin,
77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that an "ultimate employment decision" includes such

actions as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating).
185.

83 F. Supp. 2d 754 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

186. Id. at 760.
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2619, 2651-2654 (2000).
188.

Darby, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 756.

189. Id.
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tually brought suit against her employer.' 90 With respect to her ADA association claim, she alleged that her employer "discriminated or retaliated against her" because of her family members' disabilities. 9 '
After the court rejected the plaintiffs FMLA claims on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds, the court then addressed the merits of
her ADA association claim. 92 The court first acknowledged that the association provision does indeed protect individuals from discrimination
based upon a known association with an individual with a disability;
however, the court quickly reached its conclusion that the action taken
by the employer did not constitute an "ultimate employment decision"
required to violate the Act. 193 Specifically, the court concluded that the
alleged discriminatory actions, including poor work evaluations, coworker harassment, and written and verbal reprimands, did not constitute
actions 94 upon which the plaintiff could base her ADA association
1

claim.

The court reached this conclusion after reviewing case law under
both the ADA and Title VII. 195 In analyzing Title VII case law, the
court relied on opinions from the Fifth Circuit, which had previously observed that Title VII "was designed to address 'ultimate employment de-

cisions,' not to address every decision made by employers that arguably
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions."'' 96 Using ADA case law, the court also relied on opinions from the Fifth Circuit, which had previously observed that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision 97 was "not [designed] to address every decision made by

190. Id.
191. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000)).
192. See id. at 760. The Eleventh Amendment has been construed by the United States Supreme Court "'to embrace the larger principle that a state is granted immunity from suits initiated by
private entities or persons in federal courts, if the state has not consented to such suits."' Id. at 757
(citing Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1998)).
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See id. (relying on Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that Title VI was meant to cover only "ultimate employment decisions such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating."); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82
(5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Title VII was not meant to cover every employment action taken
against an employee); Dupre v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 8 F. Supp. 2d 908, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(quoting Dollis for the proposition that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision was not meant to cover
every employer decision); Gunderson v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 n.5
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing Dollis for the proposition that the ADA was not meant to cover every employment decision made by employers)).
196. Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000). The ADA's anti-retaliation provision is not the same as the
ADA's association provision; however, the Darby court applied a similar analysis. See generally
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employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those
ultimate decisions." ' 98 Based upon these previous pronouncements from
the Fifth Circuit, the court in Darby concluded that the plaintiffs claims
were without merit.1 99 The court therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. °°
In Moresi v. AMR Corp.,20 t the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas concluded that a plaintiff suing under the
ADA association provision did not suffer the type of adverse employment action against which the ADA was meant to protect. 202 The court
held that the plaintiff, who was suing his employer over his employer's
health insurer's decision not to cover certain expenses associated with
his daughter's treatment for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD"), was not entitled to prevail under the association provision of
the ADA.20 3 For purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the employer conceded that ADHD did constitute a disability under the ADA and that the employer knew of the plaintiff's daughter's
illness.20 4 The issue the court needed to address for purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment was whether the defendant's
health insurance carrier's decision to deny reimbursing the plaintiff for
his daughter's therapeutic and occupational and speech therapy expenses
constituted unlawful association discrimination under the ADA.205
After observing that the plaintiff himself did not have a disability,
the court noted that the ADA does afford protection for people without
Darby, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (analyzing the plaintiff's claim under the ADA association provision
by applying the same elements to establish a prima facie case for a retaliation claim as applied in
Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996)). The antiretaliation provision prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against an employee "because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or
because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
198. Darby, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (relying on Dupre, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (quoting Dollis, 77
F.3d at 781)).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 761. The court did note that some of the plaintiff's allegations - that she was denied
leave on two occasions - could have been classified as "ultimate employment decisions." Id. However, these requests were not based on any of plaintiff's family members' illnesses. Id. Additionally, the court noted that even had these requests been related to a family member's illness, the association provision of the ADA does not require an employer to modify an employee's work
schedule so as to allow that employee to care for a sick relative. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630
(2000)). See discussion infra section IV(E).
201. No. CA 3:98-CV-1518-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13644 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1999).
202. Id. at *8.
203. Id. at *2-3, *9.
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id. at *34.
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disabilities so long as those people have an association or relationship
with someone who has a disability under the Act.2 °6 The court then concluded that the plaintiff was
"clearly associated with a disabled individ20 7
ual," namely, his daughter.
The court then observed that the association provision of the ADA
had not been the subject of much litigation, and that the Fifth Circuit had
not yet established a test for evaluating ADA association claims.20 8
Therefore, the court decided to evaluate the four-element prima facie
case test for establishing an ADA association claim set forth by the
Tenth Circuit in Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy.20 9
The court concluded that the plaintiffs claim failed under the second element of the four-element test, and the court never addressed the
entirety of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 2110 When addressing the "adverse employment action" prong of the test, the court quickly decided
that this type of dispute between a healthcare provider and an individual
in that healthcare plan was not the type of adverse employment action
the association provision of the ADA was meant to cover. 21 Acknowledging that such a broad reading of the association provision would result in a large number of new ADA cases, the court observed that adopting the plaintiffs argument would "potentially bring a massive number
of routine, managed care benefit decisions under the coverage of the
ADA., 212 The court then noted that because the plaintiff had not been
suspended, demoted, or terminated as a result of his relationship with his
daughter, he did not suffer an ADA association-type injury.213 The court
therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.2 14
Similarly, in Atkinson v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc.,2 15 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held
that an ADA association plaintiff's claim failed because the plaintiff was
unable to prove that he suffered the type of injury against which the
ADA association provision was meant to protect.26 In Atkinson, the

206. Id. at *6.
207. Id. at *6-7.
208. Id. *7.
209. Id. at *7-8 (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
210. Id. at *8. The second prong of a prima facie case is "whether the plaintiff was subjected
to an adverse employment action." Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085.
211. Moresi, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13644, at *8.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at*9.
215. 45 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
216. Id. at 1295.
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plaintiff alleged that the employer violated the ADA when it denied the
plaintiffs wife, who was a diabetic, the opportunity to ride with the
plaintiff on his trucking trips as part of the "spouse rider" program. 217
The plaintiff then resigned and sued his former employer, alleging constructive discharge and a violation of the ADA.21 8
Referring to Den Hartog,the court observed that the Tenth Circuit
gave a "thorough discussion" of the association provision in that opinion. 219 After that, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case. 220 The court framed the issue as being "whether [the]
[d]efendant's denial of [the] [p]laintiff s request to participate in the
'221
spouse rider program constitute[d] an adverse employment action.
The plaintiff argued that allowing his wife to participate in the spouse
rider program was a "fringe benefit., 222 Although the court acknowledged that the ADA and its regulations did indeed prohibit discrimination with respect to "fringe benefits, 22 3 the court concluded that such
benefits were limited to "privileges such as health and life insurance
benefits, retirement funds, profit-sharing, paid holidays and vacations,
and sick leave. 224 The plaintiff was unable to provide the court with
any evidence supporting his proposition that the spouse rider program
was the type of fringe benefit the ADA and its regulations were meant to
protect; therefore, the court concluded that the program was not one of
the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" covered by the
2z The court also noted that the plaintiff had "not carried his burADA. 225
den of demonstrating that [the] [d]efendant's denial of [the] [p]laintiff's
participation in the spouse rider program affected or could affect his salary, chances of promotion, ability to perform his job, or resulted or could

217. ld. at 1292.
218. Id. at 1291.
219. Id. at 1292 n.3.
220. Id. at 1292, 1295. The court used the four-element test for establishing a prima facie case
created by the Tenth Circuit in Den Hartog. See Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085; see also discussion
supra section III of this article for the elements of a prima facie case.
221. Atkinson, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
222. Id.
223. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (2000) ("It is unlawful ... to discriminate on the
(f) [flringe benefits available by virtue of employbasis of disability... in regard to ....

ment .... ").
224.
225.

Atkinson, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
Id. at 1294. Although the plaintiff tried to argue that the case of Gonzales v. GarnerFood

Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996), supported his position, the court rejected this argument because the Gonzales case involved health insurance benefits, while this case involved a less
tangible benefit, namely participation in the spouse rider program. Atkinson, 45 F. Supp. 2d at
1293-94.
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result in any other final adverse employment action. 2 26 Therefore, the
court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate.2 27
As the cases described in this section of the article have demonstrated, some ADA association plaintiffs have lost their cases because
they were unable to demonstrate that they suffered the type of adverse
employment action the ADA was meant to cover. This is one more example of how ADA association plaintiffs have been unsuccessful when
attempting to assert claims under this provision of the Act. However, as
the next several sections of this article will demonstrate, there are still
other reasons why these claims have failed at such a high rate. One of
these other reasons is that plaintiffs have been unable to demonstrate that
their employers knew of the disability of their relative or associate.
D. Plaintiffs Who Could Not Prove Their Employers' Knowledge of an
Association or a Relationship with an Individual with a Disability
Another reason some ADA association plaintiffs' lawsuits have
been unsuccessful is that the plaintiffs have been unable to demonstrate
that their employers knew of a disability. The association provision of
the ADA specifically indicates that the employer must know of the disability, as it refers to prohibiting discrimination "because of the known
the qualified individual is known
disability of an individual with whom
2 28
to have a relationship or association.
As a result of this knowledge requirement, many plaintiffs have
failed in their ADA association cases. One such case in which an ADA
plaintiff was unable to prove his employer's knowledge of his relative's
disability is Wesley v. Stanley Door Systems, Inc. 2 29 In Wesley, the
plaintiff, a temporary worker, sued his employer after the employer did
226. Id. at 1294-95.
227. Id. at 1295. The court then went on to reject the plaintiff's claim that the decision not to
allow the plaintiffs wife to participate in the spouse rider program amounted to a constructive discharge. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to prove that his former employer's actions
"created an intolerable work situation that would compel a reasonable person to resign ...." Id.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2002) (emphasis added). The legislative history of the association provision sheds additional light on the knowledge requirement. According to this legislative
history, the "provision applies only when the employer... knows of that other person's disability."
H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 38 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 461. The plaintiff
then has the burden of proof in proving that the employer's decision was motivated by the plaintiff's
relationship or association with a person who has a disability. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 38,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 461. Congress found that the association provision would not apply if the employer was unaware of the relationship or association. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at
39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 462.
229. 986 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
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not offer the plaintiff a full-time position. 230 The plaintiff sued his employer under the association provision of the ADA, alleging that his employer failed to offer him a full-time position because of his wife's multiple sclerosis, which could have potentially increased the costs of
covering the plaintiff's heath insurance.23'
The plaintiffs only evidence that this issue played a role in the decision-making process was his testimony that the plant manager had
overheard a discussion between the plaintiff and a co-worker regarding
the plaintiffs need for health insurance.232 According to the plaintiff,
the plant manager "listened intently" to the conversation between the
plaintiff and his co-worker, during which the plaintiff spoke about both
his wife's illness and the company's medical coverage.23 3 This conversation occurred approximately one month prior to the employer's decision not to offer the plaintiff a full-time position.234
The only other evidence the plaintiff submitted to support his contention that his supervisor heard the conversation was that the plaintiff
had been able to hear a conversation between his supervisor and a coworker while standing fifteen feet away.2 35 The plaintiff offered no further testimony that his supervisor had heard any other illness-related discussions, and he indicated that his supervisor never discussed the issue
with him, and that nobody had ever told him that the supervisor had
overheard the conversation. 36 Finally, the plaintiff admitted, in his
deposition, that he had never discussed his wife's illness or his interest
in obtaining health insurance because of his wife's illness with any of his
supervisors.237
Although the court spent some time discussing the issue of whether
the employer knew of the plaintiffs wife's medical condition, the court
ultimately never made a decision as to whether the employer knew about
the plaintiffs wife's illness.238 By highlighting the weakness of the
plaintiffs evidence, the court strongly suggested that it was finding that
the employer did not have this knowledge, and the court further indicated this belief when it stated that the plaintiff would have lost his case
230.
231.

Id. at 434.

232.

See id.

Id.

233. Id. at436.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. (explaining that even if the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's wife's illness, that knowledge never entered full-time employment discussions).
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"[e/ven if [the employer] actually had knowledge of [p]laintiff's wife's
disability."2'39 The court then pointed out that the plaintiff would not
have been able to establish another of the elements of his prima facie
case, 240 a causal connection between the adverse employment action and
the plaintiffs wife's disability.241 The court focused on the fact that
there was no discussion of the plaintiffs wife's disability or about the
cost of health insurance for any of the potential full-time hires during the
meetings in which the employer discussed the hiring decisions.242 Finally, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that
the health insurance costs would have increased had the plaintiff been
hired.2 43 Therefore, the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff
could not establish a prima facie case. 2 "
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee reached a similar conclusion in Potts v. National Healthcare,L.P. 245
In Potts, the court determined that the plaintiff did not present sufficient
evidence to defeat his former employer's motion for summary judgment.246 The plaintiff had worked for his former employer for approximately seventeen years when he was terminated.2 47 He alleged that his
employer fired him because of his daughters' illnesses, while the employer claimed the plaintiff was terminated because his position had
been eliminated.24 8 The plaintiff brought suit under ERISA and the association provision of the ADA. 249 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had no evidence that the people involved in the employment decision knew that the plaintiffs daughters
were ill, and that the plaintiff could not, therefore, establish a prima facie

239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 435. The elements of the prima facie case are that "(1) (the] plaintiff was in a protected class: [sic] (2) [the] plaintiff was discharged; (3) at the time of his discharge, [the plaintiff]
was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."
Id. (citing Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53. F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995);
Deghand
241.
242.
243.

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (D. Kan. 1996)).
Id. at 436.

Id.
Id.

244.

Id.

245.

961 F. Supp. 1136 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).

246. Id. at 1140-41.
247.
248.

See id. at 1138.
Id. One of the plaintiff's daughters suffered from a congenital heart problem, while the

other daughter suffered from a growth hormone deficiency. Id.
249. Id. ERISA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because they attempt to exercise a right under an employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140.(2000).
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case.

The court first discussed the respective burdens at the summary
judgment stage, 25 1 and it then addressed the merits of the plaintiff's
claims.2 52 The court focused on whether the plaintiff presented any evidence that the employer knew of his daughters' disabilities. 253 The court
noted that the statute requires this knowledge and stated that in order to
prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff "must show that those responsible
for his termination knew, at the time of the termination, of the alleged
disability. 254 The court relied on the Seventh Circuit's statement from
Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.,255 that
[a]t the most basic level, it is intuitively clear when viewing the ADA's
language in a straightforward manner that an employer cannot fire an
employee "because of" a disability unless it knows of the disability. If
it does not know of the disability the employer is firing the employee
"because of' some other reason.
Despite the plaintiffs statements that he had "circumstantial and
indirect evidence" that his employer terminated him for illegal reasons,
the court agreed with the defendant and granted its motion for summary
judgment. 7 Specifically, the court emphasized that the plaintiff could
not prove that the two people responsible for terminating the plaintiff
had any knowledge of the plaintiffs daughters' illnesses. 258 Although
the plaintiff attempted to argue that there were more than two people involved in the decision to terminate him, he was unable to present any
evidence to that effect, and the court therefore concluded that there
were,
259
indeed, only two people involved in the decision-making process.
The court then went on to further explain why the plaintiff failed to
250. Potts, 961 F. Supp. at 1138.
251. Id. at 1138-39. Wesley v. Stanley Door System., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 433, 434-35 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (observing that "[u]nder Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ....[t]he
movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact ....
Once [this is done) the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a
genuine triable issue ..."(internal citations omitted)).
252. SeePotts, 961 F. Supp. at 1139-41.
253. Id. at 1139-40.
254. Id. at 1139 (citing Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995); Hedberg
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994
F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1993).
255. 47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995).
256. Potts, 961 F. Supp. at 1139 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 928).
257. Id. at 1138, 1140-41.
258. Id. at 1139.
259. Id. at 1139 n.2.
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create genuine issues of fact about the employer's knowledge. 26" First,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs "bald assertion" that he discussed
his daughters' health problems with his immediate supervisor was not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 26 1 Next, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs statement that he discussed his daughters'
health problems with an administrator in the location in which the plaintiff worked was irrelevant because262that person did not have a role in the
decision to terminate the plaintiff.

The court then rejected the plaintiffs arguments that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the defendant's "management
committee" regularly discussed health insurance and made health claim
reports available to that committee, and that the defendant's "health care
representative" received health claim reports.263 This, according to the
plaintiff, demonstrated that. the defendant did know about the plaintiff's
daughters' health problems. 264 The court quickly rejected this argument,
concluding that the plaintiff was unable to show that the decision makers
were a part of this committee, that the decision makers were "health care
representatives," or that the decision makers ever received any information regarding the plaintiffs health care claims.2 65 Finally, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was unable to rebut the defendant's claim
that individual claims were never discussed at these meetings.266 As a
result, the court characterized the plaintiffs "evidence" as "speculative,"
and therefore insufficient to defeat the employer's motion for summary
2 67

judgment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
also ruled in favor of a former employer in Bates v. Powerlab, Inc.,268
because the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the employer knew

260. Id:at 1140-41. The court spent quite a bit of time criticizing the plaintiffs response to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court's
rules. Id. at 1140. The court criticized the fact that the plaintiff claimed to have evidence to rebut
the defendant's assertions, yet he failed to present any of this evidence in response to the employer's
motion for summary judgment. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that when confronted with the
option of "putting up" or "shutting up," the plaintiff was unable (or. unwilling) to present enough
evidence to rebut the employer's claims. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1140 n.3.
263. Id. at 1140.
264. See id.

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268.

No. 3:97-CV-2551-P, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 1998).
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that the plaintiff's spouse was ill. 269 In Bates, the plaintiff sued his former employer after being terminated. 270 According to the employer, the
plaintiff was fired, for failure to report to work on a Saturday, even
though the employer reminded the plaintiff that he was required to do
so. 27127After receiving his right to sue from the EEOC,272 the plaintiff
filed suit under Title V11 273 and under the association provision of the
ADA.274
The court first granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII claim and then turned to the merits of
the plaintiff's ADA association claim.27 5 When examining the ADA
276
claim, the court indicated that it would use the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting formula used in Title VII cases, which first required the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, and then to attempt to rebut the
defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." 7 With respect to, the prima facie case, the court
adopted the Tenth Circuit's formulation from Den Hartogand concluded
that the plaintiff could not establish the prima facie case. 278 The court
determined that the "undisputed summary judgment evidence on file indicates that [the plaintiff's supervisor] had never met [the] [p]laintiff's
wife and he did not know she was disabled., 279 Because of this, the
court concluded that the alleged disability "could not have been a determining factor in the decision to terminate [the] [p]laintiff' s employment. ,280 Because the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case,
summary judgment was appropriate.281
As the cases described in this section demonstrate, some ADA as-

269. Id. at*13.
270. Id. at *3.
271. Id.
272. Id. A plaintiff must first receive his Notice of Right to Sue prior to initiating a lawsuit
against his employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000).
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to 2000e-17 (2000) (alleging reverse discrimination).
274. Bates, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034, at *2.
275. Id. at *6-11.
276. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework to an ADEA claim); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII disparate treatment claims on the basis of
race); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII sexual discrimination claims).
277. Bates, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034, at *11.
278. Id. at *12-13.
279. Id. at *13.
280. Id.
281. See id. at *13-14.
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sociation plaintiffs have lost their cases because they were unable to
demonstrate that their employer knew of the relationship or association
with an individual with a disability. However, as the next several sections of this article will demonstrate, there are still other reasons why
these ADA association claims have failed. One of the reasons many
ADA association plaintiffs have lost their cases is because they mistakenly believed that the ADA requires employers to provide a reasonable
accommodation for individuals who have associations with individuals
who have disabilities; however, as the following cases demonstrate, although the ADA does require employers to provide accommodations to
individuals with disabilities, there is no such obligation to provide an accommodation to an individual who is associated with, or related to, an
individual with such a disability.
E. Plaintiffs Who Lost Because they Mistakenly Believed that the ADA
Requires Employers To Accommodate Employees with Relatives
or Associates With Disabilities
Although the ADA requires employers to accommodate individuals
with disabilities as long as such an accommodation would not present an
undue hardship on the employer,28 2 the association provision of the ADA
has no such requirement.283 Many of the cases that will be discussed in
this section of the article have made this clear by relying on the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance to the association provision of the ADA.284 That
Interpretive Guidance specifically addresses this situation, and despite
the EEOC's pro-employer interpretation of this aspect of the association
provision of the ADA, many plaintiffs have tried to argue that such a
failure to accommodate establishes an ADA association violation.2 85
The EEOC's Guidance provides:
It should be noted, however, that an employer need not provide the applicant or employee without a disability with a reasonable accommodation because that duty only applies to qualified applicants or employ282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2000). Specifically, the term "discriminate" includes
"not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity." Id.
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
284. See generally 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (2000) (stating that an employer does not have to
accommodate an employee who is associated with an individual who has a disability).
285. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 60 F. Supp. 2d 384, 395 (D.N.J. 1999).
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ees with disabilities. Thus, for example, an employee would not be
entitled to a modified work schedule as an accommodation
to enable
286
the employee to care for a spouse with a disability.
Despite the lack of such a reasonable accommodation requirement,
many ADA plaintiffs have attempted to use the ADA association provision as a means to obtain relief when their employer did not agree to accommodate a request that would have enabled the employee to care for a
sick relative or associate. Not unlike other ADA plaintiffs who have attempted and failed to obtain relief under this provision of the ADA,
these plaintiffs have, also been unsuccessful when attempting to assert
these claims.
One such case in which a plaintiff attempted to use the association
provision of the ADA to obtain an accommodation to care for her sick
son was Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Insurance Cos.287 . In Kennedy, the
plaintiff had worked for her former employer for approximately thirteen
years, and for the seven years prior to her resignation, the plaintiff was
on "short-week status," which allowed her to care for her son, who suffered from autism and a "severe seizure disorder., 288 However, after a
performance evaluation, the plaintiffs employer informed her that she
would no longer be able to work on "short-week status" and that she
needed to return to her original schedule. 289 Because the plaintiff would
not have been able to care for. her son under these conditions, she resigned and brought an eleven-count complaint against her former employer.29 °
After denying the employer's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs age discrimination claims, the court focused its attention on
the plaintiffs disability claims. 291 The plaintiff alleged that her former
employer violated the ADA and the state equivalent to it, the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), when her employer required
her to go back to work on her original, full-time schedule.292 The court
first addressed the plaintiffs state law claim and concluded that because
there was no similar association language in the state anti-discrimination
statute, the plaintiffs state law claim was without merit. 293 Despite the

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (citations omitted).
60 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J. 1999).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 395.
Id.
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plaintiffs attempt to convince the court that because the NJLAD is a
remedial statute it should be read broadly, the court refused to recognize
plaintiffs discrimination claim under the state statute and proceeded to
address the plaintiff's ADA association claim.294
Although the plaintiff attempted to argue a trial on the merits was
required to decide her case, the court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment.295 After acknowledging that the ADA does prohibit
discrimination against someone because of her association or relationship with an individual with a disability, and that there was not a significant amount of case law addressing this provision of the ADA, the court
of relief under the association proviconcluded that the plaintiff's theory
296
sion of the ADA was "untenable.,
After reviewing the relevant case law, the court concluded that the
association provision "does not mandate that an employer provide an
employee without a disability with a reasonable accommodation to enable the employee to care for a disabled individual with whom the employee is associated." 297 Rather, the court concluded that the purpose
behind this provision of the ADA was to "prohibit employers and potential employers from taking adverse employment action because of a
known disability of an individual with whom the qualified employee or
applicant is known to have a relationship or association. 298 Ultimately,
the court concluded that "the ADA does not require [the defendant] to
allow [the] plaintiff to continue to work part time because her request in
that regard is necessitated by her need to care for her disabled son, [and
that the] plaintiff has no claim under the association provision of the
ADA., 299 The court therefore granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the ADA and NJLAD association discrimination
claims.3 °°
Another case in which the plaintiff attempted to use the association
provision of the ADA to obtain relief after being fired from her former
294. Id.
295. Id. at 395-96. The plaintiff also argued that it was imperative for the court not to make a
decision without a full trial record, because of the importance of the public policy issue presented by
her case. Id.
296. Id. at 396.
297. Id. (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1084-85 (10th Cir. 1997); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs. Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994); Padilla v. Buffalo State Coll. Found.,
958 F. Supp. 124, 128 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Miller v. CBC Co., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1066 (D.N.H.
1995)).
298. Id. (basing its conclusion on the previously mentioned case law, as well as on the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance to the C.F.R.).
299. Id.
300. Id.
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30 1
position was Rocky v. Columbia Lawnwood Regional Medical Center,
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
In Rocky, the plaintiff brought suit under the ADA's association and
anti-retaliation provisions, as well as under the FMLA and Title VII.3 °2
The plaintiff had been discharged after receiving numerous warnings
about her poor attendance record and other workplace violations, but she
claimed that the reason for her termination was her relationship with her
disabled son.30 3
After first discussing the burdens required at the summary judgment stage,30 4 the court addressed the merits of the plaintiff s association
claim under the ADA.305 The court first acknowledged that the ADA
does indeed prohibit discrimination based upon a known relationship or
association with an individual with a disability, but then noted that the
association provision of the ADA differs from the provisions of the
ADA that protect employees with disabilities.30 6 Specifically, the court
noted:

In contrast [to the other provisions of the ADA], the associational provision of the ADA does not require employers to make any "reasonable accommodation" for the disabilities of relatives or associates of a
nondisabled employee. Because the ADA does not require employers
to accommodate nondisabled employees, a "qualified individual," as
used in the associational provision of the ADA, is an individual who
can "perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds3 7or desires" without regard to the availability of
any accommodation.

0

The court based this statement on specific parts of the ADA's legislative history, and in particular on a House Report that gave the following example of how the association provision was meant to help individuals with relatives or associates with disabilities:
[A]ssume, for example, that an applicant applies for a job and discloses
to the employer that his or her spouse has a disability. The employer
believes the applicant is qualified for the job, The employer, however,
301. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
302. Id.at 1162.
303. Id.at 1162-63.
304. Id. at 1163-64. See supra note 251 for the appropriate standards governing motions for
summary judgment.
305. Rocky, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
306. Id. at 1164-65 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 1165 (internal citations omitted).
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assuming without foundation, that the applicant will have to miss work
or frequently leave work early or both, in order to care for his or her
spouse, declines to hire the individual for such reasons. Such refusal is
prohibited .... In contrast, assume that the employer hires the applicant. If he or she violates a neutral employer policy concerningattendance or tardiness, he or she may be dismissed even if the reasonfor
the absence or tardiness is to carefor the spouse. The employer need
not provide any accommodation to the nondisabledemployee.
After reviewing this legislative history, the court concluded that
"the purpose of the associational provision is to prevent an employer
from making an unfounded assumption that an employee who has an association with a disabled person will miss work in order to care for that
person., 30 9 The court then evaluated the plaintiffs prima facie case using the four-element test from Den Hartog and concluded that the plaintiff was only able to prove two of the four elements: that she suffered an
adverse employment action and that her former employer knew of her
relationship with an individual with a disability.31 0
With respect to the plaintiffs inability to prove that she was qualified for the position, the court observed that "if the nature of an employee's position requires her to regularly and reliably attend work, and
she fails to meet that requirement, then she is not qualified for the
job., 31 ' After concluding that the plaintiffs former job did indeed require regular and reliable attendance, and that the plaintiff was unable to
satisfactorily perform that aspect of her position, the court decided that
she was not qualified for the position.31 2 The plaintiffs situation, according to the court, was similar to the situation Congress addressed
when discussing this provision in the legislative history of the ADA, that
being that when an employee "'violates a neutral employer policy conceming attendance or tardiness, he or she may be dismissed even if the
reason for the absence or tardiness is to care for' a child with a disability. '313 Thus, the court agreed that no accommodation was necessary

308. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61-62 (1990), reprintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343-44).
-309. Id.
310.

See id. at 1166 (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir.

1997)).
311. Id. (construing Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79 (11th Cir. 1994); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1994); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N.
Am., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1998), affd 181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999)).
312. See id.

313.

Id. at 1167 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61-62 (1990), re-

printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343-44).
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314
and that the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to prevail.
Another case that addressed the issue of whether the association
provision of the ADA requires an employer to make an accommodation
for a person who has a relationship or an association with a person with
a disability was Atkinson v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc.3 15. In Atkinson, the plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging that the employer
violated the ADA when it denied his wife the opportunity to ride with
the plaintiff on his trucking trips. 316 Although the court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on a different basis, it did briefly
address the accommodation issue. 317 The court noted that the association provision does not require an employer to accommodate the
disabilities of relatives or associates of an employee who is not disabled. 318 The court noted, "[t]he plain language of Title I of the ADA
requires that only job applicants or employees, but not their relatives or
associates, need be reasonably accommodated., 319 This opinion, therefore, provides further support for the proposition that ADA association
plaintiffs are not entitled to accommodations.
As the cases in this section demonstrate, some ADA association
plaintiffs have lost their cases because they mistakenly believed that the
ADA requires employers to provide accommodations for them. Unfortunately for these plaintiffs, the legislative history, the language of the
statute, the EEOC interpretation of this provision, and case law all show
that employers are not required to provide any type of accommodation
for these individuals. On a related issue, the next section of this article
will demonstrate that because these individuals typically require additional time away from work in order to take care of their ill relatives or
associates, several courts have simply determined that these plaintiffs
were not qualified for the positions in question and were therefore unable to prevail under the association provision of the ADA.

314. Id.
315.

45 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ala. 1998).

316.

Id. at 1292.

317.

See id. at 1292-93 n.4, 1295.

318. Id. at 1293 n.4 (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1084 (10th Cir.
1997)).
319. Id. at 1293 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1084; 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.8 (2000)). As was discussed in section IV(C), the court ultimately decided this case on the
"ultimate employment decision" part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Nonetheless, the court did

indeed discuss the fact that employers are not required to accommodate an individual based on that
person's relative's disability. Id. at 1293 n.3. Another issue raised in this case was whether the
plaintiffs wife's diabetes was a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 1291-92 n.2.
The court declined to answer that question because it was able to decide the case on the "adverse
employment action" requirement of the prima facie case. Id. at 1292 n.2.
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F. Plaintiffs Who Lost Because They Could Not Prove They Were
"Qualified"
Another area in which plaintiffs have had trouble with association
discrimination claims is in their ability (or inability) to prove that they
were "qualified." This failure is similar to the failures the plaintiffs experienced in the cases described in the previous section of this article, in
that because they were not entitled to a modified work schedule or any
other type of accommodation to care for the ill associate or relative, they
were unable to prove that they were able to devote the amount of time
needed to successfully perform the job in question.
One example of this comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Tyndall v. NationalEducation Centers.320
In Tyndall, the court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the
employer was appropriate after the plaintiff was unable to show that she
was qualified for her former position or that the former employer had
any discriminatory motive when it terminated her employment.3 2' In
Tyndall, the plaintiff was hired as an instructor in her former employer's
medical assisting program, and as a result of her own medical condition
(lupus) and her son's medical condition (gastro-esophageal reflux disease), she was forced to miss an excessive number of days from work.322
Although her employer attempted to accommodate the plaintiff in numerous ways, it was unable to do so when she requested additional time
off to care for her son's post-operative care.323 Despite what seemed to
be an "amicable" separation, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC,
alleging that her former employer had violated the ADA.32 4 Tyndall alleged that she was discriminated against because of her own condition
and because of her association with her disabled son. 325 After the EEOC
concluded that the evidence did not establish an ADA violation,326 the
plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, also alleging a violation of the Virginians with Disabili-

320.
321.
322.
323.

31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
Seeid. at214,216.
Id.at 211.
Id.at 211-12.

324. Id. at212.
325. Id.
326. Id. Potential plaintiffs are entitled to bring discrimination claims in federal court even if
the EEOC does not issue a finding that is favorable to them. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (concluding that a "for cause" determination by the EEOC was
not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a Title VII plaintiffto bring suit in federal court).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/5

44

Rosenthal: Association Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities
176

HOFSTRA LABOR &EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:132

ties Act.327 The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment on all counts, and the plaintiff appealed.3 28
The Fourth Circuit first focused on whether the plaintiff was indeed

qualified for her position. 329 Tyndall claimed that her positive performance evaluations proved that she was qualified for the position, while the
court focused its attention on whether the plaintiff was able to attend
work on a regular basis. 330 The court noted that in addition to possessing
the required skills, an employee "must be willing and able to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis., 331 The court
continued, "[e]xcept in the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all work-related duties at home, 'an employee who does
not come to work, cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or
otherwise.' ' 332 The court concluded that Tyndall was unable to meet
and held she was not "qualified" for her
these attendance requirements,
333
teaching position.
Next, the court observed that the association provision of the ADA
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or potential
employees based upon the "'belieff] that the [employee] would have to
miss work' in order t6 care of a disabled individual. 3 34 The court, however, concluded that the employer's decision was not based upon a belief
that the plaintiff would have to miss work to care for her son; it was
based on the fact that the plaintiff did indeed take time off from work to
care for her son. 335 The court therefore affirmed the lower court's grant327. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 212; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41. "(A) No employer shall discriminate in employment or promotion practices against an otherwise qualified person with a disability solely because of such disability .... (C) An employer shall make reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental impairments of an otherwise qualified person .. " Id. §
51.5-41(A), (C).
328. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 212.
329. Id. at 212-13.
330. Id. at 213.
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd, 831 F.2d
298 (6th Cir. 1987)). The court then went on to cite numerous cases for the proposition that for an
employee to be "qualified," he or she must be able to attend work on a regular basis. Id. (relying on
Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278,
1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309 (E.D. Va. 1991), ajTd, 956
F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1992); Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd,
928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1991)).
333. Id. at 213-14.
334. Id. at 214 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2000)).
335. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
Because [the plaintiff's] termination was not based on any assumption regarding future
absences related to [her son's] care, but instead resulted from her record of past absences
and her clear indication that she needed additional time off, we hold that [the defen-
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ing of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ADA association claim.336
The Tyndall case was followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North
America, Inc.,3 37 when it decided that an employee with a poor work attendance record failed to establish a prima facie case under the association provision of the ADA. 338 Hilburn sued her employer under the association provision and the actual disability provision of the ADA after
she was terminated and not hired for an alternate position with the employer. 339 The plaintiff claimed that her illness (coronary heart disease),
her son's illness (a brain stem tumor), and her husband's illnesses (pancreatitis and diabetes) were the reasons the employer terminated her. 340
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was unable to prove that she or
her family members had disabilities within the meaning of the ADA, and
that the plaintiff was not qualified for her position because of her excessive absenteeism. 34 1 Hilburn appealed the decision of the district court
on her ADA claim, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's
judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, and that she was unqualified for the positions in
question. 342 The court did not address whether the plaintiffs family
members were disabled because the outcome of the case did not hinge
on either of those determinations.3 43
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the merits of the plaintiffs association claim, observing that the ADA protects individuals from discrimination based on an association with a family member or other-person, but
that the plaintiff must prove the four elements established in Den Hartog
in order to establish a prima facie case. 344 Although there are four elements to prove a prima facie case, the court was able to base its decision
on only one element of the test - that the plaintiff was not qualified for
dant's] actions did not constitute discrimination based on [the plaintiff's] association
with a disabled individual.
Id.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
129 F.3d

Id.at 216.
181 F.3d 1220 (llth Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1224-25.
Id. at 1222-23, 1231.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1222, 1231.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1230-31 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000); Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad.,
1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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the job.345 Relying heavily on Tyndall, the court concluded that the employer did not violate the ADA because the employer's decision was
based on the plaintiffs actual poor attendance record.3 46 Also relying
on Den Hartog, the court stated that "'if [a non-disabled employee] violates a neutral employer policy concerning attendance or tardiness, he or
she may be dismissed even if the reason for the absence or tardiness is to
care for the [disabled associate].' 347 Because the plaintiffs absences in
this case were caused either by her illness or her family members' illnesses, the court agreed that the plaintiff was not qualified for the position, and that summary judgment in favor of the employer was appropriate. 348
Another case where a plaintiff was unable to prove she was qualified for the position in question is Pittman v. Moseley, Warren, Prichard
349
& Parrish,
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In Pittman, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the
ADA's association provision after she was terminated from her position
as a paralegal with the defendant law firm. 350 The plaintiff was let go as
a result of her poor attendance record, which was caused by her daughter's autism and the plaintiff's need to care for her.351
In this case, the defendant, a law firm, hired the plaintiff as a paralegal, with full knowledge of the potential conflicts associated with the
plaintiffs daughter's illness.35 2 In fact, the record was clear that the law
firm had stated its willingness to accommodate the plaintiff's schedule in
order to allow the plaintiff to continue working.353 Eventually, as a result of the plaintiffs daughter's worsening condition, the plaintiff asked
for an indefinite leave of absence.3 54 After this request, the defendant
terminated the plaintiff, which led the plaintiff to bring this ADA association claim.355
The court first acknowledged that the ADA does indeed provide a

345. Id.at 1231.
346. Id.
347. Id. (relying on Den Hartog,129 F.3d at 1083 (quoting H.R. REP.No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 344)).
348. Id. The court did not address whether the plaintiffs family members were disabled because the outcome of the case did not hinge on either of those determinations. Id.
349. No. 3:01-CV-279-J-21TJC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17030 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2002).
350. Id.at *1-2.
351. Id. at *5.
352. See id. at *2.
353. Id.
354. Id. at *5.
355. Id. at *1-2, *5.
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cause of action based on association discrimination.356 The court then
set out the familiar prima facie case test and proceeded to analyze the
plaintiffs claim under this test. 357 The defendant had conceded that the
plaintiff had established two of the four elements:-that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action and that the defendant knew the plaintiff had a family member with a disability. 358 However, the plaintiff was
unable to prove the other two elements of the prima facie case.35 9
Because the basis of the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff was her attendance record, the court first noted that although the
ADA does list a modified work schedule as an accommodation,3 6 ° the
association provision does not require an employer to provide any accommodations to a non-disabled employee. 361 Also, even though the
Code of Federal Regulations suggests that an employer cannot discriminate against a non-disabled employee on the basis of a concern that the
employee would miss too much work, "an employer's decision to terminate an employee based on an established record of absences to care for
a disabled person" did not violate the ADA.362
After addressing these employee attendance concerns, the court relied on additional case law for the proposition that "'except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all work-related
duties at home, an employee who does not come to work cannot perform
any of his job functions, essential or otherwise.' ' 363 Because the plaintiff was not able to attend work on a regular basis, and because the plaintiff's job was not a job that allowed for work to be done at home,364 the
court concluded that she was not qualified for her job, and that she was

356. See id. at *8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000)).
357. See id. at *8-10.
358. Id. at*10.
359. Id. at *13, *20.
360. Id. at *11.
361. Id. at *11 (relying on 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2000)).
362. Id. at *11 (relying on Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th
Cir. 1999); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994)).
363. Id. at *12-13 (quoting Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)).
The court observed that "a regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most
jobs," and that "an employee must be able to meet a job's attendance requirements to be considered
qualified for the job." Id. at *13 (quoting Wimbley, 642 F. Supp. at 485).
364. The plaintiff attempted to argue that because her employer had allowed her to work at
home in the past, she should have been entitled to a more flexible attendance policy. Id. at *15.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the ADA association provision does not require an
employer to provide any accommodations to non-disabled individuals, and that simply because the
employer allowed her to work from home in the past, her position was not one that did not require
regular attendance. Id.
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therefore unable to establish this part of her prima facie case.365 As a result, summary judgment was appropriate.3 66
As the previous cases have demonstrated, another basis upon which
plaintiffs' ADA association claims have failed is the plaintiffs' inability
to prove that they were qualified for the positions in question. As the
next few sections ofthis article demonstrate, there are other reasons why
these ADA plaintiffs have been so unsuccessful. One such reason is
that, although some plaintiffs have been able to overcome each of the
previously addressed hurdles to prevail in an ADA association claim,
these plaintiffs were unable to prove a discriminatory motive behind
their employers' adverse employment actions.
G. Plaintiffs Who Were Unable to Prove DiscriminatoryMotives
Another reason many ADA association plaintiffs have failed under
this provision is because they were unable to prove that their employers
acted with a discriminatory motive. With most cases involving intentional discrimination,36 7 the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.on this issue, and many times the plaintiff is unable to carry this burden.36 8
Therefore, even if the plaintiff can prove an association with an individual with a disability, often times this plaintiff cannot prove a discriminatory motive behind the employer's actions. This failure occurs either at
the prima facie stage of the case, during which the plaintiff must present
facts that raise a reasonable inference that there was a connection between the disability and the adverse employment action, or at the "pretext" stage, where the employee must prove that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment action is not the real reason.
One case in which an ADA association plaintiff was unable to
demonstrate that her former employer's articulated reasons for her disSeeid. at,*13.
Id. at *21. See also Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir.
1995) (determining that plaintiffs ADA association claim failed because plaintiff was not meeting
employer's legitimate work expectations, and plaintiff was thus not qualified for position).
367. Some anti-discrimination statutes also prohibit "unintentional" discrimination, which occurs when an employer adopts a policy that has an adverse effect, or "disparate impact," on a protected class. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (2000)). While Title VII recognizes such a theory of discrimination, there is much less
certainty whether the ADEA allows for a disparate impact cause of action. See Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has recently
heard oral argument on the issue of whether the disparate impact cause of action exists under the
365.

366.

ADEA; however, at the time of publication, the Court had not yet issued its ruling in Smith v. City
of Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 1724 (2004).

368. See Wascura v. City ofS. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242-43(11th Cir. 2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5
2004)

ASSOCIA TION DISCRIMINATION

charge were pretextual was Wascura v. City of South Miami.369 In Wascura, the plaintiff was terminated from her position as City Clerk after
being employed in that position for almost fourteen years. 370 Her termination occurred less than four months after she notified her employer
that her son was in the later stages of AIDS, and that he had recently
moved into her home. 37 1 She had also informed her employer that she
might have to take time off from work in order to take care of some of
her son's medical needs. 37 2 After her termination, the plaintiff sued her
former employer, alleging violations of the FMLA and the association
provision of the ADA.373 The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on both counts, and the plaintiff appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit.374
After first acknowledging that the ADA does protect employees
with relationships or associations with people with disabilities, the court
adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting formula for evaluating
those cases.375 The court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff
could establish a prima facie case, and then addressed the reasons proffered by the employer for the plaintiffs termination.376 Although the
plaintiff initially did not receive a reason for her termination, the employer testified that the plaintiff was terminated for several reasons, including her personality, her lack of integrity, her dealings with other individuals, her lack of trustworthiness, her job performance, her decision
to sign documents she should not have signed, her decision to charge
personal items to the city, and her decision to sell products out of the
City Clerk's office.377
The court then addressed the plaintiffs arguments that tried to
demonstrate that the employer's reasons for termination were pretext for
discrimination based on the plaintiffs association with her son.378 First,
the plaintiff pointed to the temporal proximity between her decision to
tell her employer about her son's condition and the employer's decision
369. 257 F.3d 1238 (11 th Cir. 2001).
370. Id. at 1240.
371. Id.at 1241.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1240.
374. Id. at 1241-42.
375. Id. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 50 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (applying the McDonnell Douglasburden-shifting formula); Den
Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997).
376.
377.

378.

Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1243-44.

Id. at 1241, 1243-44.
See id. at 1244-47.
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to terminate her. 379 The court concluded that although a close temporal
proximity can, in some cases, support a connection between the two
events, the three-and-a-half month gap in time in this case was not sufficient, "standing alone," to support a finding of pretext. 380 The plaintiff
also argued her alleged misconduct had occurred prior to her informing
her employer of her son's illness, and that because her employer did not
terminate her until after finding out about her son's illness, there was
evidence of pretext. 38' Giving credence to the employer's explanation
for the delay, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument and found the
explanations for the employer's decision to be adequate.382
The plaintiff then argued that her long employment record further
supported her argument that the termination occurred because of her
son's illness; however, the court rejected this argument, concluding that
although the plaintiff did not have any complaints in her personnel file,
there was no formal review process for the plaintiffs position.3 83 The
court also rejected the plaintiff's additional evidence of pretext, concluding that the employer's decision not to give a reason for the plaintiffs
termination at the time the plaintiff was notified of that decision was not
384
evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motive.
According to the court, the only possible evidence regarding any
discriminatory motive was one comment to the plaintiff that she could
use her son's situation as an excuse for why she left her employment as
City Clerk; however, this statement was seen by the court as the employer giving the plaintiff a justification as to why she left her position if
she was questioned about it by future potential employers.3 85 After reviewing this evidence, the court concluded that no jury could have concluded that the termination was based on the plaintiffs association with
her son and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment.3 86
Another case where the plaintiff was unable to prove that her employer acted with a discriminatory motive is Ennis v. National Ass'n of

379. Id. at 1244 (arguing lack of complaints concerning her performance, her boss's failure to
provide a reason, and the lack of an independent investigation into her discharge, all demonstrate
pretext for discrimination).
380. Id. at 1244-45 (relying on Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir.
1997); Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997)).
381. Id. at 1245.
382. See id. (finding that the employer's decision to wait until enough votes could be gathered
to terminate plaintiff if she refused to resign was enough to defeat plaintiff's evidence of pretext).
383. See id.
384. See id. at 1246.
385. See id.
386. Id. at 1248.
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Business & Educational Radio, Inc.,387 from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In addition to having problems establishing that her son suffered from a disability and that she was qualified
for her position, the plaintiff in Ennis was unable to prove her employer
acted with a discriminatory motive.388 More specifically, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of the employer because the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the last element of her prima facie case: that her termination occurred under3 cir89
cumstances that would permit an inference of discriminatory motive
In Ennis, the plaintiff alleged that her employer terminated her as a
result of her association with her HIV-positive son and the high health
insurance costs associated with that relationship. 390 After addressing the
first few elements of the prima facie case, the Fourth Circuit addressed
the final issue, that being whether the plaintiff presented facts that gave
rise to an inference of discrimination.39 ' In addition to finding that the
plaintiff was not meeting her employer's legitimate work expectations,
the court found that the evidence the plaintiff presented did not raise an
inference that her employer terminated her as a result of the costs associated with having an employee with an HIV-positive son.392 The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the employer's decision to send a
memorandum to its employees regarding health insurance coverage was
evidence that the employer terminated her because of the costs of having
an HIV-positive relative.393 The court decided that this memorandum
was "too remote and too tenuous" to conclude that there was a discriminatory motive.394 Therefore, because the plaintiff could not present evidence to support a discriminatory motive on behalf of her former em387. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
388. Id. at 62.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 57.
391. Id. at 59-62.
392. Id. at 62.
393. Id.
394. Id. Specifically, with respect to this memorandum, the court observed:
The trier of fact would have to infer from an innocuous notice informing employees
about their insurance, that [the defendant] wanted to prevent its employees from filing
expensive claims against its insurance, that [the defendant] knew [the plaintiff's] son was
HIV-positive and would incur substantial medical expenses, and that [the defendant] decided to fire [the plaintiff] as a direct result. The building of one inference upon another
will not create a genuine issue of material fact ....Mere unsupported speculation, such
as this, is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.
Id. (relying on Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987); Beale v.
Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355,
364 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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ployer, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment.3 95
Another case in which the plaintiff was unable to prove that he was
terminated as a result of his family member's disability came from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc.396 In Rogers, the plaintiff sued his former
employer, alleging that he was terminated as a result of his disability, his
wife's disability, and because his former employer wanted to prevent
397
him from exercising certain rights under the employer's benefit plan.
The district court had granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment on the ADA claims and the ERISA claim, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects.398
In Rogers, the plaintiff suffered from ankle pain and was eventually
released from his employment after working there for nine years.399
This was part of the employer's reduction in force, and the plaintiff was
selected to be released due to his absenteeism and inability to work for
the months leading up to the decision to terminate him. 400 Also important to his ADA claims was the fact that the plaintiffs wife suffered
from Crohn's
Disease, a fact of which the plaintiffs employer was
40 1
aware.

The Fifth Circuit first addressed whether the plaintiff was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA.40 2 After concluding that the plaintiff did
not prove he suffered from a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity or that the plaintiff was a qualified individual
with an actual disability, the court then considered whether he was able
to prove that his former employer regarded him as being disabled.40 3
Once again, however, the court found the plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the plaintiff could not establish that he was
regarded by his employer as having a disability.4 °
The court then addressed the plaintiffs argument that he was terminated because of his relationship with his wife, who suffered from

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.

87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 758.
Id. at 757.
Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 757, 760.
402. Id. at 758.
403. Id. at 759-60.
404. Id. at 760.
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Crohn's Disease. 40 5 The Fifth Circuit first acknowledged that the ADA
does indeed protect employees who suffer adverse employment actions
as a result of their association or relationship with an individual with a
disability. 40 6 The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff failed to
present sufficient evidence that his employer terminated him because of
his relationship with his wife. 407 Although the employer knew of the
plaintiffs wife's illness, there was not sufficient evidence to create a
jury question with respect to whether this knowledge was proof of a discriminatory motive. 408 In fact, the court noted that the evidence suggested that the plaintiff was counseled as a result of his absences caused
by his own medical problems, and these warnings did not once refer to
the plaintiffs wife's problems. 40 9 Therefore, the court concluded that
there was no issue of fact with respect to whether the plaintiff was terminated because of his relationship with his ill wife, and it therefore affirmed the summary judgment. 410
Another case in which the plaintiff was unable to prove that a discriminatory motive was behind an employer's adverse employment action was Wesley v. Stanley Door Systems, Inc. 41 1 In Wesley, not only

was the plaintiff unable to demonstrate that the defendant knew that the
plaintiffs wife suffered from multiple sclerosis, but the plaintiff also
412
failed to show a discriminatory motive.
Although the court determined that the plaintiff could not establish
the knowledge requirement of his prima facie case, it nonetheless examined whether the employer had a discriminatory motive when it refused
to offer the plaintiff a full-time job.4 13 The employer articulated several
reasons for not hiring the plaintiff on a permanent basis, those being that
his "total work performance" did not justify awarding him a permanent
position, he was seen wandering from his work station talking to other
employees during working hours, he was seen in the cafeteria when he
should have been working, and he exchanged money with a co-worker
405. Id. For a thorough discussion about Crohn's Disease and other gastrointestinal disorders
and how the ADA has treated individuals with these illnesses, see Rosenthal, Can 't Stomach the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct? How the Federal Courts Have Gutted DisabilityDiscrimination

Legislation in Cases Involving Individuals with GastrointestinalDisorders and Other Hidden Illnesses, supra note 4.
406. Rogers, 87 F.3d at 760.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 760-61.
410. Id. at 761.
411. 986 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
412. Seeid. at436.
413. Id.
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(making the plaintiffs supervisor suspect him of illegal activity). 4 14 In
response to these reasons articulated by his employer, the plaintiff tried
to present evidence to cast doubt on the veracity of them.4 15
The plaintiff was able to present evidence that he and his co-worker
never exchanged money, he did not wander away from his work station
at inappropriate times, two of his supervisors had recommended him for
a permanent position, he was "a good worker," and he was "smart, dedicated, and showed initiative. 4 16 Finally, the plaintiff was able to present
evidence that a co-worker believed he was a better worker than the other
employees whom the defendant hired instead of the plaintiff.41 7 Despite
being presented with this evidence to contradict the defendant's articulated reasons, the court still granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment.4 18 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks,41 9 the court implicitly found that although the
plaintiff presented some evidence that the proffered reasons were false,
he was unable to present additional evidence that the employer acted in
response to the plaintiffs wife's illness. 420 Specifically, the court observed that "[b]efore becoming entitled to bring the case before the trier
of fact[,] [p]laintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which a jury
can reasonably reject the employer's explanation and conclude that the
employer's decision to discharge was wrongfully based on discrimination. 'A 2 1 The court then concluded that the plaintiff was unable to provide sufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive and that summary
judgment was therefore appropriate.4 22
As the previously described cases demonstrate, even if ADA association plaintiffs are able to overcome the preliminary hurdles to succeeding on an ADA association claim, many plaintiffs still fail. However, unlike the cases described in some of the earlier sections of this
article, where the plaintiffs were unable to even get to attack the employer's motives, the plaintiffs in these cases failed because they were
unable to prove that the employer acted with any discriminatory motive.
Nonetheless, as is the case with most ADA association claims, the plain414.
415.
416.
417.

See id. at 436-37.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.

418. Id.
419.
420.

509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Wesley, 986 F. Supp. at 437.

421. Id. (emphasis added) (relying on St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08
(1993); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (6th Cir. 1994)).
422. Id.
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tiffs in the cases described in this section of the article were also left unprotected by the ADA's association provision. This, however, is still not
the final reason these plaintiffs fail. As the next section of this article
will demonstrate, some plaintiffs who have attempted to use the ADA
association provision were unable to prove that the facts of their cases fit
neatly within this provision of the ADA.
H. Cases in Which PlaintiffsLost Because Their Claims Were Not
"True "Association Claims
Another reason why some ADA association plaintiffs have lost
their claims is because the facts giving rise to their complaints did not fit
neatly into what the association provision of the ADA was intended to
protect. In these cases, courts have determined that although the plaintiffs might have been wronged by their employers, the association provision of the ADA was not the correct avenue for relief.
In one such case, Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Department of
Health,4 23 the plantiffs were unable to prevail against their former employer on their ADA association claim.424 The plaintiffs alleged that
they were terminated because of their opposition to the way in which
their employer handled a variety of AIDS-related issues. 425 The plaintiffs had been supporters of people with HIV/AIDS and alleged that their
support and advocacy on behalf of these individuals resulted in numerous adverse employment actions.4 26 After the plaintiffs were terminated,
they filed a multi-count complaint, alleging violations of the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Puerto Rico Civil Code.4 27
The court first turned to the merits of the plaintiffs' ADA claims
and rejected two of the three plaintiffs' non-association-based ADA
claims, concluding that these plaintiffs did not have disabilities. 428 The
court concluded that the third plaintiff, who was blind, did allege sufficient facts to at least survive the defendant's motion to dismiss. 4 2 9 Although the plaintiffs did not raise the association provision in their complaint, the court did acknowledge that pursuing their claims through this

423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

38 F.
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.

Supp. 2d 91 (D.P.R. 1999), aJfd, 214 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
101.
94.
97-98.
94.
98-99.
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avenue was at least a possibility. 430 The court first discussed the Code of
Federal Regulations and noted that the association provision was included in the ADA to protect individuals from discrimination because of
an association or family relationship with people with disabilities.4 31
The court also noted that the provision was included in the Act to prevent employers from failing to hire individuals because of the mistaken
belief that those applicants would miss time from work, and to prohibit
employers from discriminating against individuals who volunteer with
AIDS patients out of fear that these employees might contract the disease. 432 After discussing the regulations and history behind the association provision of the ADA, the court then went on to address the merits
of this claim.43 3
Relying on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Den Hartog,the court articulated the four-part test used to determine whether a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of association discrimination.43 4 Although the
court determined that the plaintiffs were indeed able to establish, for
purposes of a motion to dismiss, the first three prongs of the test, the
court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege
"that they lost their positions because of their association with
HIV/AIDS patients. '435 Specifically, the court went on to observe that
the association provision "is intended to apply to situations in which an
employer takes an adverse action against an employee based on a belief
about the disability of the employee's associate. ' 436 The court also observed that this provision was intended to prevent employers from taking
adverse employment actions "because of stereotypes or unfounded beliefs regarding the associate's disability. ' 437 Concluding that the plaintiffs' allegations did not fall within the scope of the association provision
and the regulations and legislative history behind it, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' ADA association claim must fail.4 38 The plaintiffs
430. See id. at 99.
431. Id. at 100 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8, app. § 1630.8 (2000)).
432. Id. (relying on 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8).
433. Id. at 100-01.
434. Id. at 100 (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 101 (relying on Barker v. Int'l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15 (D. Me. 1998)).
438. Id. Specifically, the court noted:
In this case, assuming [p]laintiffs' allegations are true, [p]laintiffs do not claim they were
dismissed because of their employer's beliefs regarding H1V/AIDS patients with whom
[p]laintiffs were associated. Rather, [p]laintiffs claim they were dismissed because of
their advocacy on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients as part of their jobs at the Department of
Health. Thus, [p]laintiffs [sic] claims are not covered by section 12112(b)(4) ....
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appealed the district court's judgment, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, after noting the purposes behind the association provision of the ADA, 439 affirmed the district court's judgment.440
In a case similar to Oliveras-Sifre, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health,
Inc. ,441 determined that an ADA association plaintiff did not engage in
the exact type of behavior the ADA association provision was meant to
protect.4 42 Specifically, in Freilich,the plaintiff sued various individuals
and medical entities after she lost her privileges at a hospital.443 The
plaintiff brought several claims against various defendants and also included a claim alleging that she was discriminated against as a result of
her advocacy on behalf of individuals who needed dialysis treatment.4 44
After addressing the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional challenges
and her other ADA claim, 445 the court addressed the plaintiffs ADA
association claim.446
After referring to Oliveras-Sifre and to another similar case, Barker
v. InternationalPaper Company,447 the court concluded that this type of
patient advocacy was not what Congress intended to protect when it enacted the association provision of the ADA. 4 8 Specifically, the court
stated:
[The plaintiff] alleges that [the defendant] "coerced, intimidated,
threatened, or interfered... with [her] because she exercised rights
protected by the ADA," and that [the defendant] discriminated against
Id.
439. Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 26 (1stCir. 2000). In addition
to the two examples cited by the district court, the First Circuit also noted that the association provision would have come in to play if an employer denied health benefits to the dependent of an employee, even if granting such benefits would have resulted in higher insurance costs to the employer.
Id. at 26 (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
440. Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
441. 313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002).
442. Id. at 217; see also Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 679 (D. Md. 2001) (district court opinion).
443. Freilich,313 F.3d at 209.
444. ld. at 209-10.
445. Id. at 211-15. The plaintiff attempted to claim that she had standing to sue on behalf of
the individual dialysis patients; however, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing
to assert those claims. Id. at 214-15.
446. Id. at 211-16 (concluding that plaintiffs claim construed associational discrimination too
broadly).
447. 993 F. Supp. 10 (D. Me. 1998).
448. Freilich, 313 F.3d at 215-16.
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her because she refused "to end her advocacy of the dialysis patients'
rights that were being violated under [the] ADA." She further alleges
that she was "denied equal use of facilities, privileges, advantages or
other opportunities because of her association with and her relationship
to patients with disabilities." But such generalized references to association with disabled persons or to advocacy for a group of disabled
persons are not sufficient to state a claim for associational discrimination under the ADA. Every hospital employee can allege at least a
loose association with disabled patients. To allow [the plaintiff] to
proceed on such a basis would arm every hospital employee with a potential ADA complaint.
A step of that magnitude is for Congress, not
449
this court, to take.

Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing
the plaintiff s claim.450
As this section of the article has demonstrated, one additional reason why plaintiffs have failed in their ADA association claims is that the
facts giving rise to their causes of action do not fit neatly into what Congress envisioned when it enacted the association provision of the ADA.
However, regardless of the reason why these ADA association claims
have failed, this article has demonstrated that most plaintiffs attempting
to use this provision of the ADA have been unsuccessful. 451 This is not
unlike the many unsuccessful ADA plaintiffs who have attempted to
seek the statute's protection because of their own disabilities.452 This is
yet more proof that the "era of equality" to which President Bush referred when signing the ADA into law has not been realized by all of
those who need ADA protection.
449. Id. at 216.
450. Id. at 217.
451. But see Jackson v. Serv. Eng'g, 96 F. Supp. 2d 873, 874, 882 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment due to allegations that the employer terminated plaintiff
because of plaintiffs wife's illness); Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F. Supp. 2d 467, 470, 482
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss complaint alleging discrimination based
on association with HIV-positive individuals); Morgenthal v. AT&T Co., No. 97-CIV. 6443, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4294, at *1-2, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1999) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss complaint alleging discrimination based on plaintiffs' association with an individual who had a
developmental disorder); Padilla v. Buffalo State Coll. Found., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 124, 124, 128
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because of employer's decision to withdraw plaintiff's employment offer due to plaintiffs child's illness); Deghand v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1002, 1022 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs ADA association claim). But see also Doe v. An Oregon Resort, No.
98-6200-HO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17449, at *30 (D. Or. May 10, 2001) (finding in favor of
plaintiff on each of his ADA claims); Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1585 (N.D. Okla. 1996)
(finding in favor of plaintiff and awarding damages).
452. See supra note 4; see also supra note 9.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR ADA PLAINTIFFS

As a result of the very narrow interpretation the courts are giving
the association discrimination provision, individuals who find themselves subjected to adverse employment actions, possibly because of
their association or relationship with an individual with a disability or an
illness, must find other potential avenues to recovery. Because the
courts do not seem to be willing to open the ADA association provision
up to cases not initially contemplated by Congress when it passed the
ADA, these individuals must explore other options.453 This section of
the article will address some of these options. Specifically, this section
will briefly look into the possible use of the anti-coercion and antiretaliation provisions of the ADA,454 the ERISA statute,4 55 the FMLA,456

and the use of state and local anti-discrimination laws. Although none
of these options provides a guarantee for relief, there is the possibility
that a plaintiff who is unable to prevail in an ADA association claim will
be able to obtain relief under one of these alternatives.
A. The Anti-Coercion and the Anti-RetaliationProvisionsof the ADA

In addition to the substantive prohibitions against discriminating
against individuals with disabilities and those who are related to or associated with individuals with disabilities, the ADA also protects employees from being punished for helping or aiding others in their exercise of
ADA rights. According to the statutory language, the anti-coercion provision provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or
her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having
453. At times, the Supreme Court has expanded statutory protections to situations not considered to be the "principal evils" Congress meant to address. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998) (determining that although same-sex sexual harassment was
not the "principal evil" Title VII originally intended to address, such conduct did violate Title VII
when it was "because of the sex."); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80
(1976) (concluding that although discrimination against minorities was the principal evil Congress
meant to address when passing Title VII, non-minorities were also protected by that legislation).

But see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1248-49 (2004) (declining to extend the ADEA to protect younger workers who received less favorable treatment than older employees).
454. 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2000).
455. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2000).
456. Id. §§ 2601-2619, 2631-2654.
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or enjoyment
aided or encouraged another individual in the exercise
457
of any right grantedor protectedby this chapter.
Additionally, the anti-retaliation provision provides: "No person
shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
458
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.,
Although not every potential association-type claim will fit under
one of these particular statutory provisions, some ADA plaintiffs have
been successful in cases brought under one of these provisions after suffering an adverse action they thought was a result of their association
with an individual with a disability.
One such case where the plaintiff attempted to pursue a claim under
the anti-coercion provision of the ADA was Barker v. InternationalPaper Co. 4 5 9 Although the plaintiff in this case lost his association claim at
the summary judgment stage, he was able to defeat the employer's
summary judgment motion on his claim brought under the anti-coercion
provision of the ADA.460 In Barker, the plaintiff and his wife had
worked for the defendant, and both were eventually terminated from
their positions.46 1 Prior to his wife's termination, the husband requested
an accommodation for his disabled wife.462
Although the employer provided an accommodation, the plaintiff's
wife's supervisor was angered over the plaintiffs advocacy on behalf of
his wife and indicated that she would go to the plaintiffs manager to try
463
to get him fired if he continued to advocate on his wife's behalf.
Shortly after receiving the plaintiffs wife's EEOC charge, the plaintiffs
supervisor started having troubles with him.464 The plaintiff was eventually terminated, and in addition to his claim for association discrimination, he alleged that his former employer terminated him because of his
advocacy on his wife's behalf.465 This allegation was partially the result
of being told that one example of the plaintiff's poor interpersonal skills
was demonstrated by the way in which he handled the situation with his

457. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (emphasis added).
458. Id. § 12203(a).
459. 993 F. Supp. 10 (D. Me. 1998).

460. Id. at
461. Id. at
462. Id. at
463. Id.
464. Id. at
465. Id. at

15-16.
12-13.

12.
12-13.
13-14.
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The court first identified the three prima facie elements under this
type of ADA claim: (1) he aided his wife in ADA-protected activity; (2)
he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.467 The employer did not dispute that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; therefore, the two remaining issues
involved the protected activity issue and the causal connection issue.468
The plaintiff convinced the court that he engaged in a protected activity
4 69
when he requested an accommodation on behalf of his disabled wife.
Although the defendant argued that the only reason the plaintiff asked
for the accommodation was because the plaintiffs wife was busy at the
time, and that the plaintiff was therefore not engaged in a protected activity, the court rejected that argument. 47 0 According to the court, the
plaintiff "easily satisfie[d]" that element of the prima facie case.47 1
Finally, the court addressed the causal connection issue and determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact on this part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, and that summary judgment was inappropriate.472 Specifically, the plaintiff was able to point to the comment his
supervisor made to him regarding the way the plaintiff handled his
wife's request for a reasonable accommodation, and the plaintiff was
also able to point to the close temporal proximity between the plaintiffs
initial problems with his supervisor and the timing of his wife's EEOC
charge.473 These two pieces of evidence were sufficient to defeat the
employer's motion for summary judgment.47 4 Therefore, although he
was unable to prevail in his association claim, the plaintiff successfully
used the anti-coercion provision of the ADA to at least get past the employer's motion for summary judgment.
In addition to the anti-coercion provision of the ADA, which was
the subject of the Barker opinion, the ADA also contains an antiretaliation provision. In some circumstances, some ADA plaintiffs who
believe they have been discriminated against as a result of some type of
relationship with individuals with disabilities might be able to pursue an
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472..
473.
474.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
See id.

Id.
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action under this provision of the ADA in addition to, or instead of, under the association provision of the ADA. Of course, not all plaintiffs
who have attempted to pursue this avenue have been successful.
One such plaintiff was the plaintiff in the previously discussed case
of Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.475 Specifically, in
Freilich, the plaintiff sued various individuals and medical entities after
she lost her privileges at a hospital.47 6 The plaintiff brought several
claims against various defendants, and she also included a claim alleging
that she was discriminated against in retaliation for her advocacy on behalf of individuals who needed dialysis treatment.477 After addressing
the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional challenges and ADA association claim, 478 the court addressed the plaintiffs retaliation claim. 47 9 The
court first acknowledged that the ADA does indeed protect individuals
against adverse employment actions an employer takes against them in
retaliation for their opposition to practices made unlawful by the
ADA.4 80 For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under this particular ADA provision, she must demonstrate that she (1) engaged in ADAprotected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment action after engaging in the protected activity; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.481 With respect to the first element of the prima facie case -that the
plaintiff engaged.in a protected activity - the Fourth Circuit indicated
that the employer behavior the employee opposes need not be an actual
ADA violation; however, in order for the employee's activity to be considered protected, the employee must have a "reasonable, good faith belief' that the employer's behavior violated the ADA.482 Because the
court concluded that the plaintiff in this case could not have had a reasonable, good faith belief that what she opposed constituted ADA violations, she
was unable to establish the first element of her prima facie
3
case.

48

The plaintiff in Freilich opposed several of the hospital's decisions
regarding the treatment dialysis patients received.4 84 Although the court
475.

313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002).

476. Id. at 209.
477. Id. at 209-10.
478.
479.

Id. at 211-16.
Id. at 216-17.

480. Id. at 216.
481. Id. (relying on Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001)).
482. Id.
483.

Id.at 216-17.

484. Id.
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concluded that the plaintiff might have had -legitimate concerns over
these issues, the court also decided that these issues brought into question state medical malpractice laws, but did not bring into question any
ADA concerns.48 5 Because the plaintiffs concerns dealt mostly with the
hospital's decisions with respect to patient care and the outsourcing of
particular services, no ADA issues were implicated, and the plaintiff
could not have had a reasonable, good faith belief that she was opposing
anything made illegal by the ADA.48 6 The court concluded that "[e]very
disagreement over the adequacy of hospital expenditures or the provision of patient care is not an ADA issue. If it were, courts would be
drawn into medical resource disputes quite beyond their expertise and
hospital personnel would be diverted by litigation from their primary
task of providing medical attention ....
,87
, Thus, because the issues
about which the plaintiff was complaining were not ADA issues, the
plaintiff s ADA retaliation claim failed.4 88
Although not all claims brought under the anti-coercion and antiretaliation provisions of the ADA have succeeded, potential plaintiffs
should consider the possibility of using these provisions of the Act. In
the association context, if a plaintiff finds herself facing an adverse employment action as a result of trying to assist someone to pursue an ADA
issue with their common employer, she should attempt to pursue an action under the ADA's anti-coercion provision. Or, if an employee finds
herself in a situation where she suffers an adverse employment action as
a result of opposing employer conduct she reasonably believed violated
the ADA or as a result of participating in any type of ADA-related proceeding or investigation involving another individual, she may indeed be
able to pursue a retaliation claim against her employer. Although neither
is a perfect solution, a plaintiff might be able to prevail under one of
these statutory provisions when her claim under the association provision does not fit neatly into what Congress envisioned when it enacted
the association provision of the ADA. However, if neither of these potential avenues is an option, then a plaintiff might have to turn to other
statutes for potential remedies.

485.
486.
487.
488.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Attempt. to Assert an ERISA Claim

Another potential avenue for plaintiffs who believe they are being
discriminated against because of a relationship with an individual with a
disability is ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.489

Protection under ERISA is available when an employee believes that she
was terminated because of her employer's desire to interfere with the
employee's rights under an employee benefit plan. In the association
context, a potential ERISA violation is likely to be found when an employee believes she was terminated as a result of an employer's effort to
minimize health insurance costs by eliminating an employee whose fam-

ily members need expensive medical treatments.
One employee who was able to defeat an employer's motion for
summary judgment on her ERISA claim was the plaintiff in the previously mentioned case of Smith v. Hinkle Manufacturing, Inc.4 90 Although the plaintiff in Smith lost her ADA association claim at the sum-

mary judgment stage, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate on her
ERISA claim.49 '
In Smith, the plaintiffs ERISA claim alleged that she was terminated as a result of her employer's desire to avoid high health insurance
costs associated with the plaintiffs son's disease.4 92 In addressing the
plaintiff's ERISA claim, the court first explained what ERISA prohibited

- interfering with an employee's right to attain any rights to which that
employee is entitled under an employee benefit plan4 93 - and then proceeded to explain how to analyze this type of dispute.494 After conclud489. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2000).
490. 36 FED Appx. 0825P (6th Cir. 2002). See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
491. Smith, 2002 FED App. at 0830P-0831P.
492. Id. at 828.
493. Id. Specifically, ERISA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of
this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under
the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any
person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act. The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of
this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
494. Smith, 2002 FED App. at 0828P-0830P.
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ing that the plaintiff presented no direct evidence of a discriminatory
motive, the court used the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence
burden-shifting framework.495 The court first determined that the plaintiff did establish her prima facie case.496 In addition to establishing the
preliminary elements of the prima facie case, the plaintiff was also able
to point to a close temporal proximity (two weeks) between the employer's knowledge of the plaintiffs son's illness and the adverse employment action.497
The defendant then articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff: poor job performance.4 98 Once the defendant met this burden of production, it was up to the plaintiff to demonstrate (or at least create a genuine issue of fact) that poor performance
was not the true reason for the discharge and that one motivating factor
for the adverse employment action was to interfere with the plaintiffs
rights under the employee benefit plan. 499 The plaintiff was unable to
show that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment
action had "no basis in fact," as the employer was able to show that the
plaintiff did have some performance issues.5 °° Similarly, the plaintiff
was unable to demonstrate that other employees with performance problems - but who did not attempt to exercise rights under an employee
benefit plan - were treated more favorably than the plaintiff.50 ' However, despite the inability to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to
the issue of pretext by the preceding two methods, the plaintiff was able
to point to other facts that did create such an issue of fact.50 2
Specifically, in addition to the close timing between the plaintiffs
informing her employer of her son's health condition and the adverse
employment action, the plaintiff was also able to present evidence that
(1) the defendant's accounting supervisor had made statements that
families with health problems were causing insurance rates to increase
and that these costs were a "drain on the company"; (2) the plaintiff had
495. Id. at 828.
496. Id. at 829. In order to establish a prima facie case under ERISA, the plaintiff must show
"(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of
any right to which the employee may become entitled." Id. at 828 (citing Humphreys v. Bellaire
Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992)).
497. See id. at 829 (relying on Pennington v. W. Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902, 908 (6th Cir. 2000);
Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 865 (6th Cir. 1997); Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404,
1411 (6th Cir. 1996); Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (6th Cir. 1992)).
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 829-30.
502. Id. at 830.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/5

66

Rosenthal: Association Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities
198

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:132

received an eight percent pay raise six weeks prior to her discharge, suggesting that the company was not unhappy with her performance; (3) the
employer had, in the past, warned other employees about termination
anywhere between five and fifty times before actually terminating that
employee, yet the company warned the plaintiff only once prior to her
termination; and (4) the complaints upon which the company relied to
terminate the plaintiff all occurred in the two-week period between her
telling her employer about her son's medical condition and her termination.50 3 The court concluded that looking at this evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, she at least created a jury question with
respect to whether her employer terminated her in an effort to interfere
with the plaintiff s rights under her employee benefit plan.5 °4
Thus, the Smith 'case is one example of where a plaintiff who lost
her ADA association claim was able to at least defeat her employer's
motion for summary judgment on her ERISA claim. Thus, when a potential ADA association plaintiff believes that her employer terminated
her as a result of a sick relative (and the health insurance costs associated with that illness), in addition to attempting to assert an ADA association claim, that plaintiff should also attempt to assert an ERISA
claim.
C. Attempt to Assert an FMLA Claim
Another possible avenue ADA association plaintiffs can attempt to
pursue is the Family and Medical Leave Act.50 5 Although this legislation will only apply in limited association-type circumstances, it might
provide some relief to plaintiffs who find themselves suffering adverse
employment actions as a result of having to ask to take time off from
work to care for a sick family member, or in retaliation for having taken
time off from work in order to care for a sick family member.
The FMLA allows eligible employees to take unpaid leave from
work under certain, limited circumstances;50 6 and it also prohibits employers from retaliating against them for taking such leave.50 7 Under the
503. Id. at 827, 830.
504. Id. at 830.
505. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2619, 2631-2654 (2000).
506. Id. § 2612(a)(1).
507. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2000). The regulations for the FMLA provide:
An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an employee on leave without pay
would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits
would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

67

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5

2004]

ASSOCIATION DISCRIMINATION

FMLA, eligible employees are entitled to up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave for (a) the birth of a child and to care for the child; (b) the placement of a child for adoption or foster care; (c) the care of a spouse or
immediate family member with a "serious health condition"; and (d) a
serious health condition that prevents the employee from performing the
functions of her position.50 8 With respect to how and when the FMLA
might be similar to the ADA's association provision, it is subsection (c),
above, that becomes the most relevant; both the association provision of
the ADA and subsection (c), above, address situations where an employee's relative is somehow involved in the adverse employment action.
There are at least two potential situations where this might occur.
First, if an employee does avail herself of FMLA leave to take care of a
sick relative and is later terminated or discriminated against in retaliation
for taking leave, then that plaintiff could bring a claim under the
FMLA.50 9 Although some plaintiffs might think these facts could give
rise to an association-based claim under the ADA and try to fit these
facts into an ADA association-based cause of action, the more appropriate remedy would most likely be under the FMLA.
A second potential situation where the FMLA and the association
provision of the ADA might seem to overlap is when an employer terminates an employee who asks to take leave to care for a sick family
member. Although some employees might attempt to pursue an ADA
association claim, another avenue to pursue is to seek relief under the
FMLA. Under the FMLA, an employer cannot prevent an eligible employee from taking leave to care for the sick relative, and although the
employer is not required to pay the employee during this leave, the employee must be restored to the same or an equivalent position after returning from caring for the sick relative.5 10 Therefore, the FMLA does
provide some protection in factual situations that, might also seem to
raise the prospect of an ADA association claim.
Employees need to be aware, however, of some of the "technical"
differences between these two pieces of legislation. Some of these diftoken, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be
counted under "no fault" attendance policies.
Id.
508. 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1).
509. See id. § 2615(a)(2).
510. Id. §§ 2612(c), 2614(a)(1). Typically, the FMLA prohibits employers from terminating
employees while they are on FMLA leave, but there are some limited exceptions to this prohibition.
See id. § 2614(b) (2000).
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ferences make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail under the FMLA, while
other requirements of the FMLA make it more difficult for potential.
plaintiffs. The first difference, which may prove helpful for employees,
is the FMLA's definition of a "serious health condition."51' 1 While the
ADA's association provision's protections are not triggered unless a
plaintiff can demonstrate that her relative or associate has a "disability,"
FMLA plaintiffs need only prove that their family member suffers from
a "serious health condition., 512 Unlike the high standard courts have established for ADA plaintiffs, the standard for FMLA plaintiffs is less
rigorous; a plaintiff is more likely to be able to satisfy the FMLA's definition of "serious health condition" than the ADA's "disability" definition.
One such example of this occurred in Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp.,513
where the plaintiff lost his ADA claim and his FMLA claim. However,
the court did observe that although his high blood pressure did not satisfy the ADA's definition of "disability," it could meet the FMLA's
definition of "serious health condition., 514 Specifically, in Oswalt, the
plaintiff appealed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, arguing that he was entitled to both ADA
and FMLA protection. 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit
disagreed with the plaintiff and affirmed the lower court's
16
5

judgment.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that his
high blood pressure (or the side effects from his medication) substantially limited the plaintiff in any major life activities; therefore, the plaintiff did not have a disability, and the ADA did not provide the plaintiff
with any protection. 5 17 With respect to the plaintiffs FMLA claim,
which was based on his high blood pressure and a case of food poisoning, the Fifth Circuit quickly concluded that the plaintiffs food poisoning did not constitute a "serious health condition" because it did not in-

511. The FMLA defines a serious health condition as: "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves--(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)

(2000).
512.
513.
514.
515.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (2000).
74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 92. See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (district

court opinion).
516. Oswalt, 74 F.3d at 92-93.
517. Id. at 92.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

69

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5
2004]

ASSOCIATION DISCRIMINATION

volve in-patient care or continued medical treatment.518 However, the
court did conclude that the plaintiffs high blood pressure could be considered a "serious health condition" under the FMLA. 519 The plaintiff,
however, was unable to win his FMLA claim because the FMLA had not
yet become effective when the plaintiff's claim arose.52 °
Oswalt is therefore a good example of where an individual could
not meet the rigorous ADA definition of "disability," but was able to
meet the FMLA's definition of a "serious health condition. 52 1 In the
association context, this might be helpful when, although an ADA
association plaintiff is unable to prove that her relative can satisfy the
ADA's strict definition of "disability," she can demonstrate that her
relative can meet the less stringent "serious health condition" definition
found in the FMLA. This could, in some cases, eliminate the problem
the plaintiffs described in section IV (A) of this article faced when
pursuing their ADA association claims, and provide these plaintiffs with
a different avenue to pursue.
The potential FMLA plaintiffs should, however, be aware of certain
limitations of the FMLA. The FMLA does protect certain employees
from losing their jobs while having to care for a sick relative and from
retaliation for having done so; however, the FMLA does not protect all
employees, and its coverage is limited only to individuals with a spouse
522
or an immediate family member with a "serious health condition.
This scope of protection under the FMLA is narrower than the ADA association provision, in that the ADA association provision is not limited
to family members, but can also protect an individual from an adverse
(rather
employment action taken because of that person's association
523
disability.
a
with
individual
an
with
relationship)
than a
Another potential problem for employees attempting to assert rights
under the FMLA is that the FMLA does not cover all employees. First,
the employee must work for an employer with fifty. or more employees. 524 This minimum of fifty employees is higher than the ADA's
518. Id.at 92-93.
519. Id.at 93.
520. Id.
521. See also Stekloffv. St. John's Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the FMLA's definition of "serious health condition" and the ADA's definition of "disability" are two separate concepts, and concluding that the FMLA's definition of "serious health condition" is less stringent than the ADA's definition of "disability").
522. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000).
523. See id. § 12112(b)(4).
524. Id. § 261 1(4)(A)(i). Specifically, the definition of an "employer" is "any person engaged
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees
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minimum number of employees, which is fifteen.5 25 Additionally, employees seeking leave under the FMLA are required to have worked for
the particular employer for a minimum of twelve months and for a statutorily designated number of hours during that twelve-month period.5 26
These are just some of the potential pitfalls of pursuing a claim under the FMLA.5 27 This is not to say, however, that a plaintiff would not
be able to pursue this statutory remedy when facing a situation in which
she finds herself suffering an adverse employment action because of her
decision to take time away from work to care for an ill relative, or because she suffers an adverse employment action because her employer
will not allow her time away from work in order to take care of that ill
relative. Thus, potential ADA association plaintiffs should also investigate the possibility of bringing an FMLA claim when deciding which
causes of action to pursue against their employer.
D. Attempt to Assert a State Law Claim
Although not all state anti-discrimination statutes contain an association discrimination provision similar to the ADA, ADA plaintiffs
should investigate the potential existence of such laws. Although it will
most likely be interpreted as narrowly as the ADA's association provision, some courts have construed their state or local anti-discrimination
statutes more broadly than the federal courts have interpreted the ADA.
Although most states interpret their disability statutes in a manner
consistent with how the federal courts interpret the ADA, not all states
do so. For example, even though the United States Supreme Court determined that mitigating measures must be considered when making the
for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year .. " Id.
525. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(5)(A) (2000). The ADA defines "employer" as:
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25'or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.
Id.
526. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2002).
527. The FMLA has several requirements for employees. These requirements address, among
other things, the notice an employee must provide to his employer and the medical certification regarding an employee's medical condition. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(e)(1), 2613(a) (2000). These
technical requirements are beyond the scope of this article; however, potential plaintiffs must be
aware of them.
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determination of whether an individual suffered from a disability,52 8 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that mitigating
measures should not be considered when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability within the meaning of the state antidiscrimination statute.5 29 As a result, many more individuals will be
considered disabled under the Massachusetts statute than under the
ADA. Massachusetts is not the only state that interprets its state statute's definition of disability more broadly than how the federal courts
interpret the same definition under the ADA; New York courts also interpret that state's anti-discrimination statute's definition of "disability"
more broadly than the ADA definition. 530 Therefore, if other states follow suit and adopt a more liberal interpretation of "disability," and if
these states have a prohibition against discrimination based on an association or relationship with an individual with a disability,5 3' then many
association plaintiffs will be able to overcome a hurdle many ADA
plaintiffs are unable to overcome - that they have an association or a relationship with an individual with a "disability." This, of course, will

528. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527.U.S. 471,482 (1999).
529. Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 962 (Mass. 2001). In Dahill, the court
answered whether a hearing-impaired police officer had a handicap within the meaning of the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute. Id. at 958-59. The police department argued that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should adopt the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
"disability" from Sutton (mitigating measures considered when making the initial disability determination). Id. at 959. Because the Massachusetts statute was not clear on its face, the Supreme
Judicial Court looked at other sources to discern the legislative intent. Id. at 960. After a review of
legislative intent surrounding the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, upon which the law was patterned, the guidance offered by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, and the
intent of the state legislature to construe that statute "liberally," the court determined that mitigating
measures should not be considered when deciding a state disability claim. Id. at 960-62. See also
Rosenthal, Can'tStomach the Americans with DisabilitiesAct? How the Federal CourtsHave Gutted Disability DiscriminationLegislation in Cases Involving Individuals with GastrointestinalDisorders and Other Hidden Illnesses, supra note 4, at 492-93.
530. See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 723 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that "New York
and Second Circuit cases make clear that the New York disability statute defines disability more
broadly than does the ADA."); see also Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 228, 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
531. Not all state statutes have provisions analogous to the ADA's association provision. See,
e.g., Smith v. Hinkle Mfg., Inc., 2002 FED App. 0825P, 0830P-0831P (6th Cir.) (concluding that
the Ohio equivalent of the ADA did not contain a provision prohibiting discrimination based on
association with an individual with a disability); see also Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 60
F. Supp. 2d 384, 395 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs invitation to interpret the state antidiscrimination statute to include a prohibition against discrimination based on an association or relationship with an individual with a disability); Abdel-Khalek v. Ernst & Young, LLP., No: 97-CIV4514, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2369, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1999) (rejecting a state-law association claim because the state statute does not contain a provision prohibiting discrimination based
upon an association with an individual with a disability).
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give these individuals a possible avenue to pursue when the ADA avenue is unavailable.
Plaintiffs must be aware, however, that if the state law does not
prohibit association-based discrimination, this avenue will be foreclosed.
In such cases, plaintiffs might be able to pursue local laws, as was the
case in Abdel-Khalek v. Ernst & Young, LLP.,532 where, although the
court rejected the plaintiffs state-law claim because there was no association-type language in the state statute, the plaintiffs association claim
based on New York City's Administrative Code survived the defendant's motion to dismiss because there was textual support in the Administrative Code for a discrimination claim based on association with
an individual with a disability.53 3
Thus, when facing an association-type discrimination claim, plaintiffs should also explore the possibility that state or other local laws
might provide an avenue of relief. Although not every state or local law
contains an association provision similar to the ADA, if such a provision
exists, perhaps the state court will give it a more expansive interpretation
than the federal courts are giving the ADA's association provision. If
such a provision exists, and if the local law is interpreted more broadly
than the ADA (with respect to the "disability" definition or with respect
to the scope of the association provision), then ADA association plaintiffs should definitely add one of these claims to the federal claim.
As the previous sections of this article have demonstrated, plaintiffs
who find themselves unable to pursue a claim under the ADA's association provision might have alternative avenues of relief. Specifically, if
the facts of their cases fit into the anti-coercion provision of the ADA,
the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, ERISA, the FMLA, or state or
local law, these plaintiffs should attempt to pursue these avenues as well.
Although none of these options can guarantee a successful outcome for a
plaintiff, the more causes of action these plaintiffs can pursue, the
greater their chances of finding a statute that might provide relief.
VI. CONCLUSION

Just as many plaintiffs who have attempted to use the ADA to combat adverse employment actions they believe occurred as a result of their
own disabilities have failed, most plaintiffs who have attempted to use
the association provision of the ADA have also struggled to prevail.
532.

No. 97 CIV-4514, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2369 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1999).

533. Id. at *27, *29.
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Regardless of the numerous reasons why these plaintiffs lose, it is clear
that most plaintiffs who have attempted to use this provision have been
unsuccessful.
Because of the narrow interpretation courts have given the ADA
and the association provision contained within it, it is unlikely that plaintiffs attempting to use that provision to recover for some type of adverse
employment action will be successful. Therefore, these individuals must
find different avenues of relief. Some of these plaintiffs might find help
under the anti-coercion and the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA,
under ERISA, under the FMLA, and perhaps under state and local law.
Although these statutes provide no guarantees of success, plaintiffs
should attempt to seek relief under them if they believe they have suffered an adverse employment action as a result of their association or relationship with an ill individual. Perhaps the facts of a particular case,
although not sufficient to prove a cause of action under the association
provision of the ADA, will prove sufficient under a different statutory
provision.
Just as the ADA has proven to be ineffective for individuals with
physical or mental impairments, it has also proven to be ineffective for
those who have relatives or associates with these types of health conditions. Unless and until Congress and the courts broaden the ADA's protection, the dreams of the proponents of the ADA will remain just that,
and the ADA will continue to be a very ineffective piece of "landmark"
legislation.
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